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ABSTRACT 
Economic development is a major policy objective of the governments of 
developing countries that are rich in natural resources. Nigeria has 
promoted, through legislation, the concept of Nigerian content through 
domestic capacity building and preferential participation as a policy in 
its Oil and Gas Industry(“OGI”) to achieve the objective of economic 
development. The recent enactment of Nigeria’s Local Content Act was 
inspired by considerations for economic development. This article 
analyzes the implications of this law based on the paradigm of 
international investment law. For this purpose, the context of 
international investment law is limited to the definition of “investment” 
and the international obligations of Nigeria within the framework of 
current and anticipated Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) and other 
investment related agreements with foreign investors. From this 
perspective, the analysis of this article shows that, in spite of the relative 
success of the Local Content Law, there are significant and fundamental 
conflicts with Nigeria’s obligations under international investment law 
with respect to foreign investors operating in Nigeria’s OGI. Foreign 
investment treatment standards applicable under international 
investment law are implicated in the application and administration of 
Nigeria’s Local Content Law. Thus, this article proposes that Nigeria 
should review existing BITs and other investment agreements to 
accommodate the prescriptions of the Local Content Law to sustain the 
underpinnings of economic development inherent in the law. Otherwise, 
the existing conflicts present substantial grounds for foreign investment 
claims and liability against Nigeria by foreign investors in the context of 
investment treaty arbitration. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a scathing rejoinder to Dr. Adekeye Adebajo’s op-ed in Nigeria’s The 
Guardian newspaper criticizing pertinent aspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy,1 
Amedu Ode, the spokesperson of Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported 
that Nigeria has signed Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) and other foreign 
investment related agreements with several countries to promote and attract the 
inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) to Nigeria.2 Ode was ecstatic that 
Nigeria’s targeted activities and “foreign campaigns” to attract FDI into the 
country led to about $9 billion worth of inflow of foreign investments in 2012 
alone, a fact that was confirmed by the United Nations Commission on Trade and 
 
1. Amedu Ode, The Robust Nigeria’s Foreign Policy (2), THE GUARDIAN (Lagos), May 16, 2013, at 84. 
2. Id. 
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Development.3 This feat by the Jonathan administration also received 
commendation from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.4 
According to Ode, FDI into Nigeria in this and other respects has positively 
impacted and contributed to economic development in different sectors of the 
Nigerian economy.5 FDI has generated economic activities and development in 
constituent parts of the Nigerian State including power and energy investments in 
Adamawa, Bayelsa, Lagos, Oyo and Sokoto States.6 Ode also bragged about the 
Bi-National Commission (“BNC”) between Nigeria and the United States, 
designed and established to attract FDI from American investors and businesses.7 
Indeed, Ode stressed that the BNC between Nigeria and the United States is 
evidence of both countries’ strategic partnership to work closely to promote FDI 
inflow for economic cooperation and development.8 This article will return to the 
international investment law implications of the BNC between Nigeria and the 
United States in view of the latter’s substantial foreign investments and inflow of 
FDI into Nigeria’s Oil and Gas industry (“OGI”) in the absence of a valid BIT.9 
Suffice it to state that Ode’s analysis represents Nigeria’s deliberate efforts at 
attracting FDI for economic development. However, what is lacking in Ode’s 
analysis is that Nigeria incurs international legal obligations, established by 
treaty and case law, related to the administration of FDI in the host State. 
Given that the crux of Ode’s debate with Adebajo extends to other foreign 
policy matters, it is not the task of this article to join issues with Ode regarding 
the beef between the commentators. To the contrary, this article is an attempt to 
fill the gap inherent in Ode’s analysis in view of the Nigerian Oil and Gas 
Industry Content Development Act (“Local Content Act” or “LCA”)10 in the 
context of the substantive and procedural rights of foreign investors with 
reference to Nigeria’s OGI. Aside from Ode’s innocuous approach and report of 
Nigeria’s FDI profile, there is little or no substantial scholarly analysis of 
Nigeria’s local content legislation as implicated in international investment law 






7. Ode, supra note 1, at 84. 
8. Id. 
9. See infra Part III. 
10. Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act (2010 Nigeria), [hereinafter LCA]. available 
at http://www.oandoplc.com/wp-content/uploads/Nigerian%20Content%20Act.pdf (last visited Sep. 19, 2013). 
11. See, e.g., Chimezie Patrick. Uzuegbu, The Role of University Libraries in Enhancing Local Content 
Availability in the Nigerian Community, Paper 733, LIBR.PHIL. & PRAC.(2012), http://unllib.unl.edu/LPP/ 
uzuegbu.pdf (discussing the enhancement of Nigerian local content by reviewing its objectives and making 
propositions on the roles to be played by Nigerian universities libraries to develop and publish the workings of 
the local content policy in Nigeria); Ike Oguine, Nigerian Content in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry: Legal 
and Policy Issues, 29 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 405, 405-30 (2011) (focusing on the metamorphosis of 
the local content policy since the discovery of oil in Nigeria, the operational limitations, and the difficulty 
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the OGI should include Nigeria’s legal obligations to foreign investors on the 
protection and promotion of FDI in the host State.12 The analysis of the host 
State’s legal obligation in the conduct of FDI is more relevant today in view of 
the potential adverse effects of the costs of successful investment claims on the 
economy of the host State of FDI. The effects on the economy are more serious 
and could be detrimental to economic development where the host State is a 
developing country like Nigeria. In the quest to achieve the objective of 
economic development through the exercise of legislative sovereignty, many 
developing countries pass legislation or take measures that conflict with the 
substantive rights of foreign investors in the host State.13 More often than not, 
such measures or legislation may be held to be expropriation of the proprietary 
rights of the foreign investor in the host State.14 For example, in the last ten years, 
 
created for international oil companies in Nigeria’s upstream sector. Oguine was silent on the implications of 
the law on Nigeria’s obligations in the regulation of international investments in the oil and gas industry within 
the framework of international investment law); I. A. Omenikolo & R.O. Amadi, Challenges Facing Nigerian 
Local Content in Oil and Gas Industry, CONTINENTAL J. RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 15-20 (2010) (bemoaning the 
difficulties of the administration of Nigeria’s local content law and policy, arguing that the implementation of 
the law has been largely ineffective in Nigeria citing infrastructural development, political stability, 
environmental policy as some of the most significant challenges); and Ugwushi Bellema Ihua, Local Content 
Policy and SMEs Sector Promotion: The Nigerian Oil Industry Experience INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT., May 2010, 
at 3 (arguing that the Nigerian Local Content Act has not met the objective of enhancing local capacity building 
and participation). 
12. See Francis J. Nicholson, S. J., The Protection of Foreign Property Under Customary International 
Law, 6 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L .REV. 391, 391 (1965) (observing on the protection of foreign investment that: 
“A necessary condition for the development of the international trade and investment so essential for the 
progress of underdeveloped nations and for the continuing prosperity of more advanced nations like those of the 
Common Market and the United States is the security of property invested in foreign hands against such 
noncommercial risks as discrimination and confiscation.”). 
13. The analysis in this article does not cover local content requirements in the context of the multilateral 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMS”) that may be contrary to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”) to which Nigeria is a member. There are legitimate questions about 
the utility of local contents in application and interpretation of TRIMS and GATT. TRIMS and GATT related 
investment dispute relates to international trade and services as opposed to FDI. Under TRIMS and GATT, 
potential disputes are between governments. Such disputes arise when a violation of a pertinent agreement is 
alleged by a member government through submission of a “request for consultation” by the aggrieved 
government party. This article is devoted to the analysis of Nigeria’s local content legislation with reference to 
FDI in the OGI in the broader context of the mechanism of international investment law and arbitration between 
the State Party and the foreign investor. For a more detailed examination of TRIMS and GATT under the 
framework of the World Trade Organization(WTO) with respect to local content requirements of developing 
countries. See generally Alvaro Santos, Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World 
Trade Organization: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 551 (2012). 
14. Expropriation may be considered direct and easily ascertained, where an allegation of the actual 
taking of the alien property or foreign investment in the territory of the host State can be sustained against the 
latter. This may occur in the sense of the outright seizure or the physical transfer of the title of alien property in 
favor of the host State by acts or omissions of the host State. An indirect expropriation may occur where the 
regulatory conduct or activity of the host State interferes with the value or benefits of the foreign investment. 
The act of expropriation by the host State may be direct and self-evident where there is the actual physical 
taking of alien property by or through the act or omission of the host State. See generally Homayoun Mafi, 
Controversial Issues of Compensation in Cases of Expropriation and Nationalization: Awards of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, 18 INT’L J. HUMAN. 83, 83-85 (2011). 
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investment treaty arbitration is replete with investment claims filed against 
developing countries as a result of government action or inaction over 
legislations or policies considered adverse to the interests of foreign 
investments.15 Multiple claims filed against Argentina by foreign investors 
resulting from that government’s policy and legislation that occasioned that 
country’s currency crisis are worth in excess of $10 billion.16 Investment claims 
are brought by aggrieved foreign investors directly against the host State through 
the mechanism of investment treaty arbitration where investors accept the 
consent to arbitrate claims by filing a request for investment arbitration.17 
Thus, the road map of this article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by 
examining the genesis and scope of local content legislation and policy in the 
OGI from the standpoint of considerations for economic development.18 The 
regulatory framework of local content policies is analyzed using the Norwegian 
and Brazilian models as typical examples. This part then embarks on the 
examination of the background and the eventual enactment of Nigeria’s LCA. 
Parts II-III are devoted to the examination of foreign investment treatment 
standards that may be found in BITs and other investment agreements or 
contracts with the foreign investor that are implicated in the LCA against the 
background of the administration of the local content policy in Nigeria.19 The 
article then analyzes the approach to the meaning of “investment” under Nigerian 
and international investment law to lay the foundation for the analysis of the 
critical provisions of the LCA. Part IV analyzes the pertinent provisions of the 
LCA.20 The result of the analysis in this article establishes that some provisions of 
Nigeria’s LCA are discriminatory against the interests of foreign investors in the 
OGI. It is argued that the discriminatory nature of some provisions of the LCA 
 
15. See Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance Center for 
Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 239 (2007). 
16. Id. at 250-51. 
17. Id. (Investment treaty arbitration is a neutral process of adjudicating investment claims against the 
host State brought in connection with the interpretation and application of relevant BITs and other investment 
agreements within the framework of an international arbitration mechanism. Investment arbitration mechanism 
includes the Rules of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States) [hereinafter the ICSID Convention]; The ICSID Convention opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965 
and entered into force on Oct. 14, 1966. Also see the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 
The ICSID Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules are the most commonly used Rules in investment 
arbitration. Under the UNCITRAL Rules a definition of investment only need to satisfy the BIT definition, 
whereas an ICSID claim would need to satisfy both the definition in the BIT itself and the ICSID Convention. 
The test under an ICSID claim is often referred to as the “double barrel test.” The “double barrel test” approach 
is often adopted by ICSID arbitral Tribunals where a BIT is determined to be applicable to the investment 
arbitration commenced within the framework of the ICSID Convention. On the nature of investment treaty 
arbitration; See generally Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment 
Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 53-55 (2005). 
18. See infra Part I. 
19. See infra Parts II-III. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
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violates certain foreign investment treatment standards that Nigeria as the host 
State, is obligated to respect under international investment law. The article 
concludes by proposing a review of the LCA to bring it in line with Nigeria’s 
existing and anticipated obligations under international investment law to avoid 
potential liability that may be detrimental to the Nigerian economy. 
II. THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY: THE GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT OF LOCAL 
CONTENT POLICY IN A NUTSHELL 
Local content policy models in the OGI may focus on oil concession, in-
country fabrication, procurement and services, procurement of domestic inputs or 
indigenous participation, and domiciliation of oil and gas activities in the host 
State.21 In spite of the variation in policy models, the objective of the local 
content policy in the OGI seeks to achieve capacity building to enhance and 
promote national security, development of domestic technological know- how 
and the diversification of the industrial sector through the preferential treatment 
of domestic businesses and investments. Thus, local content policy initiative is a 
conscious effort by developing countries that are rich in oil and gas resources to 
expand and extend what is believed to be the best opportunities and benefits in 
the OGI to local citizens.22 It is a policy centered on considerations of economic 
development through concrete opportunities granted to domestic businesses to 
participate actively to create employment and eradicate poverty in the host State. 
However, the premise of the local content policy has been traced to the need 
to relegate the prescriptions of the theories of “resource curse and paradox of the 
plenty.” Both theories hypothesized that, over-dependence on natural resources 
by developing countries makes the latter to be underdeveloped, when compared 
with other countries with little or no natural resources.23 At the same time, other 
scholars have argued that the economic wealth from natural resources, 
particularly in OGI, could trigger social-political crises thereby hindering 
economic development.24 The commentary and the analysis of the intellectual 
foundation of the local content policy are that it paved the way for the 
metamorphosis of a ‘Development Policy’ to avoid what has been theorized as 
the negative pitfalls of OGI resources in developing countries. According to Ado, 
a systemic local content policy that focuses on economic development 
 
21. See Rabiu Ado, Local Content Policy and the WTO Rules of Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS): The Pros and Cons, INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT.. 137, 137-46 (2013). 
22. Id. at 138-139. 
23. Richard M. Auty, Industrial Policy Reform in Six Large Newly Industrializing Countries: The 
Resource Curse Thesis, 22 WORLD DEV. 11, 11-24 (1994) (theorizing on the negative implications of natural 
resources abundance and its impact on economic development in developing countries); see also TERRY L. 
KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO-STATES (1997). 
24. See, e.g. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth 
(NEBER Working Paper No. 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995). 
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considerations was thus designed and utilized by developing countries to “avoid 
the resource curse” theory.25 Local content policy may also be applied in other 
sectors of a given economy. But with respect to the OGI, it is mostly utilized to 
increase ownership and control of oil and gas resources through mechanisms 
aimed at encouraging direct and active participation in the upstream sector 
measured by the proportion of inputs from the domestic economy.26 The local 
content policy is usually administered through a national and legal regulatory 
framework that targets a particular local content policy model in the OGI of the 
host State. 
A. The Regulatory Framework of Local Content Policies 
The regulatory mechanisms or national local content policies in the host State 
focuses on five major components of the OGI: Oil concession, In-country 
fabrication, Procurement and services, Procurement of domestic inputs, and 
indigenous participation and localization of oil and gas operations.27 The most 
notable national local content regulatory framework in the oil and gas sector in 
most developing countries reflects these policy thrusts.28 For example, Brazil’s 
national local content policy introduced through Local Content Legislation 
focuses on oil concession through domestic capacity building and enhanced 
opportunities for domiciled Brazilian entrepreneurs in the oil and gas business.29 
On the other hand, the national local content policy objective of Trinidad & 
Tobago, Kazakhstan, Indonesia and Nigeria targets procurement and services, 
procurement of domestic inputs, and indigenous participation and localization oil 
and gas operations respectively.30 The origin of these variations of national local 
content policies may be attributable to the Norwegian31 and Brazilian32 policy 
models. 
 
25. Ado, supra note 21, at 138. 
26. See Marc Ofurhie, Fiscal Policies to Support Local Content and Indigenous Participation, National 
Workshop on Improvement of Local Content Indigenous Participation in the Upstream Sector of the Petroleum 
Industry (Abuja, Nigeria 2011). 
27. Aluisio de Lima-Campos, Local Content Requirements in the Oil and Gas Sector, Local Content 
Policies in the Oil, Gas, and Mining Sector Conference, (Vienna-Austria Sep. 30-Oct. 01, 2013), 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2013/10/01/local-content-policies-in-oil-gas-mining-sector (last visited 




31. See Victor Galante, Local Content in Brazil (2013), http://www.mayerbrown.com/de/publications/ 
detailprint.aspx?publication=9196 (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (discussing the Brazilian Model asserting the focus 
of the model is oil and gas concessions through the maximization of Brazilian contents through the creation of 
the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) to promote bid rounds in the oil and gas concessions mechanism). 
32. Norway is not a developing country. But it is a country located close to the North Sea with abundant 
natural resources in oil and gas. It has successfully adopted a local content policy and strategy premised on the 
theoretical foundation that companies operating in the oil and gas industry should utilize the natural resources to 
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1. The Norwegian Model 
As in most developing countries whose Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
mostly depends on the OGI, prospecting and exploration for oil and gas began in 
Norway in the 1960s.33 However, unlike in Nigeria and some developing 
countries, shortly after the exploration of oil and gas became viable, the 
Norwegian government introduced a local content policy through legislation.34 
The Norwegian local content strategy was designed to “award contracts to 
Norwegian bidders when they proved to be competitive in terms of price, quality, 
delivery time and service”.35 According to one report, “[t]he rationale behind this 
was to promote the establishment of local industry and this was achieved through 
cooperation with international oil companies.”36 Specifically, the model created a 
framework for Norwegian active participation in the supply and production chain 
of oil and gas exploration and development in Norway.37 One source observed 
that, pursuant to the objective of the Norwegian model, “The more the [foreign] 
operators contracted with Norwegian suppliers the greater their chances in 
subsequent biddings.”38 Thus, the Norwegian model was centered on technology 
transfer aimed at strengthening Norwegian oil and gas companies in the supply 
chain. 
At the same time, it has been reported that the focus of the Norwegian local 
content strategy facilitated the establishment of substantial part of the Research 
and Development (“R&D”) centers by some major international oil companies in 
the territory of Norway.39 It seems to be critically important, that in the OGI, the 
domicile of the R&D activities of multi-national oil companies is a factor that 
should demonstrate the readiness to transfer technology and improve local 
capacity building in the industry.40 In view of the emphasis and policy 
considerations of the Norwegian local content strategy, it is valid to state that the 
 
contribute to economic development. See generally Farshad Tehrani, Norwegian Petroleum “Local Content” 
and the Relevance to Iran, Alfa Development and Engineering AS Global Local Content Summit for Oil and 
Gas (2006). 






38. De Lima-Campos, Chairman, ABCI Institute and Adjunct Professor, American University 
Washington College of Law, Vienna; De Lima-Campos, supra note 27. 
39. Norway: A Local Content Success Story, supra note 33. 
40. See Hans J. Kind, Petter Osmundsen & Ragnar Tveteras, Critical Factors in Transnational Oil 
Companies Localization Decisions-Clusters and Portfolio Optimisation 1, 2 (Foundation For Research in 
Economic and Business Administration, Bergen-Norway, Working Paper No. 53/01, 2014), available at 
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ragnar_Tveteras/publication/229048304_Critical_Factors_in_Transnationa
l_Oil_Companies_Localisation_DecisionsClusters_and_Portfolio_Optimisation/links/0912f50b5111171dfb000
000.pdf (“R&D is a stochastic process where the probability of success tends to be increasing in the number of 
research centers, the degree of interaction between research centers and end-users.”). 
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overriding motivation is founded in the objective of contribution to the economic 
development of Norway through the instrumentality of its OGI. In recent years, 
the Norwegian government has agreed to export its local content experience and 
success to some developing countries to assist in developing a viable model and 
strategy that would contribute to economic development.41 At this juncture, it is 
fair to ask whether the administration of the Norwegian local content obligation 
violates any international investment law obligation that Norway owes to foreign 
investors in its oil and gas industry, if not, why? This article will return to 
develop further on these questions as a prelude to the analysis of Nigeria’s local 
content legislation later. For now, the Brazilian model merits some consideration. 
2. The Brazilian Model 
The objective of the Brazilian local content strategy is to regulate the 
mechanism for oil and gas concessions. The regulatory framework of the local 
content policy has been sustained through several legislations.42 The analysis of 
the focus of the successive legislations showed the establishment of a system that 
specified and administered minimum local content requirements in the award of 
concession licenses in oil and gas exploration and development.43 The system 
mandates the national oil company-PETROBAS to carry out research, production 
and development of oil and gas in Pre-Salt areas.44 There are also regulations, 
pursuant to the local content policy for reporting, certification and auditing of 
local content requirements regulated by the ANP (National Agency of Petroleum, 
Natural Gas and Biofuels).45 The ANP is the government’s regulatory agency for 
 
41. In Oct. 2013, a group of Parliamentarians from Ghana visited Norway to under study the 
underpinnings of the Norwegian oil and gas industry and the utility of the industry to the economic 
development of Norway. The Ghanaian delegation was presented with a detailed outline of the Norwegian 
experience in the latter’s oil and gas industry. The visit was made as part of the cooperation between Norway 
and Ghana under the “Oil for Development Program.” See generally, Ghanaian Parliamentarians Visit Norway 
to Discuss Sustainable Politics For Oil and Gas, NORWAY—THE OFFICIAL SITE IN Ghana (Feb. 7, 2014), 
www.ghana.norway.info/News_and_events/Ghanian-parliamentarians-visit-Norway-to-discuss-sustainable-
politics-for-oil-and-gas/. 
42. See, e.g., Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.], Agosto 1997 
(Braz.); Lei No. 12.276, de 30 de Junho de 2010, D.O.U., Junho 2010 (Braz.); Lei No. 12.304, de 2 de Agosto 
de 2010, D.O.U., Agosto 2010 (Braz.). 
43. See, e.g., Law 9.478 of August 6, 1997, D.O.U. (Braz.); Law 12.276 of June 30, 2010, D.O.U. 
(Braz.); Law 12.304 of August 2, 2010, D.O.U. (Braz.). 
44. Pre-Salt exploration and development means prospecting for oil and gas in areas determined by 
geological analysis to contain oil and gas reserves underneath rock layers containing salt. It is much more 
difficult and expensive to explore for oil and gas in Pre-Salt areas. These areas are mostly common in Brazil, 
Gabon and Angola. For a more detailed examination of oil and gas exploration in Pre-Salt areas, see Claudia 
Zacour, Tatiana Z. Pereira, Angela L. R. Cristofaro & Felipe F. Francisco, Petrobas and the Regulatory 
Framework for the Exploration and Production of Oil and Natural Gas in the Brazilian Pre-salt Region, 5 J. 
WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 125, 130 (2012) (reviewing the legal and regulatory framework for the exploration 
of oil and gas in the Pre-Salt areas of Brazil). 
45. Id. 
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oil and gas exploration in Brazil.46 The Brazilian local content model is not 
without criticisms. It has been validly criticized for its lack of distinction in 
assigning roles and responsibilities for the various organs and institutions 
charged with the monitoring and administration of the local content policy.47 Two 
opponents of the model argued that the Brazilian local content policy is weak and 
lacks the prospect to generate any meaningful change in the OGI.48 The criticisms 
against the Brazilian model may be credible to a large extent. However, to the 
extent that its administration has not been criticized for violations of core BITs 
principles, there may be better opportunities to review the current system to make 
it more innovative in achieving the objective of economic development. Thus, 
the Brazilian model is a better promise for developing countries that local content 
policy initiatives through legislation is viable for considerations of economic 
development if the mechanism is properly designed and implemented, having 
regard to the host State obligations under international investment law. 
Indeed, apart from the clear considerations of economic development, a 
synthesis of the Norwegian and Brazilian models demonstrates two distinct 
systems that are designed to accommodate international law obligations in the 
conduct and treatment of foreign investments in the host State. On the one hand, 
Norwegian international investment law regime continually project a valid 
“economic development exception” in the application and interpretation of its 
local content legislation and policy that allow the government to regulate foreign 
investment in the public interest.49 This exception could limit or prevent potential 
investment claims founded on discrimination or measures considered adverse to 
the interests of foreign investors. On the other hand, Brazil has no BIT in force.50 
Brazilian local content policy is regulated by national investment agreements.51 
Most investment claims are founded in BITs and other international investment 
agreements that put international investment law obligations of the host State at 
play in the settlement of investment disputes.52 These distinct characteristics of 
the Norwegian and Brazilian models will become clearer in the analysis of 
Nigeria’s local content policy and legislation below. 
 
46. Id. at 126. 
47. See id. at 281-84. 
48. See id. at 271-87. 
49. See Luke E. Peterson, Norway Proposes Significant Reforms to its Investment Treaty Practices, 
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Nov. 11, 2014, 12:06 PM), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_mar27_2008.pdf 
(“Norway’s was impelled to develop a new negotiating template [of BITs] following growing concerns as to the 
constitutionality of concluding treaties which granted foreign investors the right to bring claims against Norway 
through international arbitration, and the potential that the arbitrators might impose limits on the exercise of 
government authorities which are granted under Norway’s constitution.”). 
50. See Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Rule of Law, 
19 GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J, 337, 362-64 (2007). 
51. See id. at 361-62. 
52. See id. at 363-64. 
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B. The Foundation and Enactment of Nigeria’s Local Content Law and Policy 
The Nigerian economy is substantially driven by foreign investments in the 
OGI.53 Nigeria’s oil and gas reserves have attracted foreign investments into the 
country for more than five decades.54 Since oil was discovered in the 1950s, 
successive Nigerian governments have formulated policies on how to utilize 
Nigeria’s oil wealth for economic development through human capital 
development and technology transfer.55 Some policy initiatives aimed at 
achieving these objectives are examined briefly below.56 
1. The Legislative Initiatives and Policies targeting Nigerian Local Content 
Prior to the LCA 
The Minerals Oils Act (“MOA”) of 1958 was passed into law shortly after oil 
was discovered in commercial quantities in Nigeria.57 The MOA established a 
licensing regime in the form of an enabling petroleum law to regulate the 
exploration and development of crude oil in Nigeria.58 The licensing regime and 
regulatory framework of the MOA were fashioned after the “British Colonial 
Model” that was also utilized and applicable then, in Malaysia, Brunei and 
Egypt.59 Pursuant to the MOA, Oil Mining Leases (“OML”) were granted by the 
Nigerian government to licensees to prospect for oil under certain terms and 
conditions.60 The MOA has an underlying initiative and policy for local capacity 
building through requirements for human capital development on skills critical to 
the OGI.61 Under the OMLs, licensees were required to design and administer a 
technical training scheme to train Nigerians as “tradesmen and craftsmen” for the 
purpose of employment in the industry.62 The OMLs also required the recruitment 
and training of Nigerians to fill jobs including and up to supervisory and 
management positions in the OGI.63 However, there was no enforcement or 
monitoring mechanism within the framework of the MOA that ensured that the 
Lessees effectively carried out the mandate of human capital development under 
 
53. See I. A. Omenikolo & R. O. Amadi, Challeneges Facing Nigerian Local Content in Oil and Gas 
Industry, CONTINENTAL J. RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 15 (2010). 
54. See id. (stating that the Nigerian economy has received returns on investments in the oil and gas 
industry in excess of $600 billion since 1956). 
55. See generally Oguine, supra note 11, at 415; Id. 
56. See generally Oguine, supra note 11, at 450-30. 
57. Bernard G. Taverne, A Study of the Involvement of Industry and Governments in the Production and 




61. Oguine, supra note 11, at 405-30. 
62. Id. at 406. 
63. Id. 
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the OMLS granted by the Nigerian government.64 The content requirement under 
the MOA did not mandate any concrete threshold for the training and 
employment of Nigerians to achieve the human capital development policy of the 
MOA.65 Probably, because of the weakness of MOA, it was repealed and 
replaced by the Petroleum Act (“PA”) of 1969.66 
The workings of the MOA also revealed significant challenges that became 
inherent in the licensing regime and extant regulations.67 There were legitimate 
issues surrounding the scope of the ministerial authority to make or issue 
regulations pursuant to the MOA particularly on matters concerning royalties and 
the utility of gas.68 Thus, the PA was principally promulgated to “modernize the 
previous licensing regime without affecting its concept and principles”.69 The PA 
contained four schedules that were accompanied by new Petroleum (Drilling and 
Production) Regulations (“PDPR”).70 One of the most significant features of the 
PA is that it gave the Minister an expanded authority to change, amend, or issue 
any regulation concerning critical aspects of petroleum operations in Nigeria 
pursuant to approved OMLs.71 However, there was a significant departure from 
the Nigerian content policy requirement under the MOA that appeared to have 
addressed some of the weakness of the MOA. The First Schedule to the PA 
created a Nigerian content target for OMLs licensees.72 The Schedule require the 
holder of an OML to “ensure that within ten years from the grant of his lease”, 
the numbers of Nigerians employed by him shall be at least 75% of the total 
number of his workforce employed by him in approved or designated grades.73 
The employment shall be in connection with the lease granted in managerial, 
professional and supervisory cadres.74 In addition, the First Schedule went on to 
provide that, “the number of citizens of Nigeria in any one such grade shall be 
not less than 60% of the total; and all skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
are citizens of Nigeria.”75 Unlike the MOA, the PDPR established a monitoring 
and enforcement mechanism for the Nigerian content relating to recruitment, 
training and employment of Nigerians through the office of the Minister of 
Petroleum Resources.76 The creation of the Nigerian National Petroleum 









71. See Petroleum Act 1969, §§ 8-9 (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Chapter P10, 2004). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Schedule 1, para. 38, Petroleum Act 1969 (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Chapter P10, 2004). 
75. Id. 
76. See supra note 33, at pp. 26-9. 
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Oil Company (“NNOC”) and the Ministry of Petroleum Resources further 
reinforced the Nigerian content policy under the PA. The NNPC was primarily 
established as an agency of the Nigerian government to operate and partner with 
International Oil Companies (“IOCs”)77 to enforce the petroleum policy of 
Nigeria. The oversight functions of the NNPC included matters connected with 
Nigerian content under the PA and the OMLs that were granted pursuant 
thereto.78 
It is debatable whether or not the Nigerian content policy under the PA met 
its objectives as envisaged with respect to human capital development and local 
capacity building. Some commentators have suggested that, to satisfy the 
conditions attached to their OMLs, the IOCs operating in Nigeria have recruited 
and trained Nigerians for various skills relevant to the OGI.79 Others have argued 
that the IOCs have not been faithful and effective in meeting the conditions of 
Nigerian content attached to their OMLs.80 Analyzing the efficacy of the Nigerian 
content directives under the PA and OMLs, one source described the mandate for 
Nigerian content under the PA and OMLs as “pocket provisions”. As a practical 
matter, the analogy of “pocket provisions” may be likened to provisions that 
were swept under the carpet with little or no consequences to the IOCs or foreign 
investors. It may be argued that, there are valid points on both sides of the debate. 
For one, there is some evidence that IOCs have recruited and trained Nigerians 
for skills that are critical to the oil and gas industry.81 
On the other hand, there is significant evidence where IOCs have treated the 
Nigerian content requirements and local capacity building with levity. Thus, it 
seems more convincing that the agitation and public commentary on the need for 
economic development through the utility of the OGI may not be unconnected to 
the lackadaisical attitude of IOCs and the ineffective provisions of the PA 
towards Nigerian content in the OGI. 
 
77. In the context of this article, IOCs also refers to foreign investors in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
78. See Anthony C. Madichie, The Functions, Powers and Role of NNPC in Nigeria’s Oil and Gas 
Industry, Presentation at the workshop organized by IIPELP in conjunction with NJI (Oct. 16-18, 2012), 
http://www.iipelp.org/pdfs/functions.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). 
79. Oguine, supra note 11, at 407. 
80. Even with the enforcement mechanism in the current Local Content Law there have been strong 
indications that some IOCs have violated pertinent provisions of the law relating to human capital development 
and local capacity building. See AfricVilla, Reps Probe Major IOCs over Local Content Violation (Oct. 28, 
2013), http://africvilla.com/index.php/africa2/10-nigeria/39-reps-probe-major-iocs-over-local-content-violation 
#sthash.nNMRRdUx.dpbs (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).81. See M.I. Gab-Umoden, Nigerian Local Content 
Development Policy, (2011)(unpublished LL.M Dissertation, Center for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law 
and Policy CEPMLP, University of Dundee)(on file with CEPMLP library, University of Dundee), 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php? news=31833 (last visited Feb.13, 2014). 
81. See M.I. Gab-Umoden, Nigerian Local Content Development Policy, (2011)(unpublished LL.M 
Dissertation, Center for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy CEPMLP, University of Dundee)(on 
file with CEPMLP library, University of Dundee), http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php? 
news=31833 (last visited Feb.13, 2014). 
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Similarly, barring the hydra-headed problem of endemic corruption, political 
instability and bad governance perpetuated mostly by past military juntas, 
Nigeria has not been competitive in attracting foreign investment in the OGI for 
economic development. In this regard, Balouga expressed the frustration of 
successive Nigerian governments this way: 
For a country with over four decades’ experience in oil and gas exploration 
and production activities and proven recoverable reserves of about 37 billion 
barrels, her inability to use the resource wealth as a means for national 
development and poverty reduction has perhaps been the greatest challenge 
facing successive administrations.82 
Thus, the proper use of oil and gas resources for economic development has 
generated a lot of debate among stakeholders in the industry. Regardless of the 
monumental foreign investments in the OGI, the debate continues to focus on the 
best ways to optimize and utilize local competences in Nigeria to maximize 
benefits that could stimulate economic development through promotion of local 
participation.83 Once there appeared to be a consensus on the maximization of the 
benefits of the OGI on economic development, the debate turned to the question 
of the modus operandi from a legal and economic perspective.84 Bolouga went on 
to explain that the need to encourage local content participation in the OGI was 
“equally expressed in Nigeria’s desire to domicile a substantial amount of the 
average $18 billion per annum exploration and production spending and stem the 
tide of capital flight which, over the years, has made Nigeria a junior partner in 
her joint venture arrangements with the International Oil Companies.”85 
It was hoped that a successful policy or legislative initiative by the Nigerian 
government to achieve this goal would encourage indigenous companies to 
compete favorably with foreign companies with superior financial and 
technological resources which would in turn contribute to economic 
development. It is trite that, from an international investment law perspective, 
any policy or legislative initiative promoted and supported by the host State for 
the realization of this objective may be described as a legitimate host-State 
regulatory objective.86 It was against this background that the Jonathan 
 
82. Jean Balouga, Nigeria Local Content: Challenges and Prospects, 3rd Q. INT’L ASSO. ENERGY 
ECON. 23, 23 (2012). 
83. Id. 
84. See e.g., Jesse Ovadia, Measurement and Implementation of Local Content in Nigeria-A Framework 
For Working With Stakeholders to Increase the Effectiveness of Local Content Monitoring, MFP030703, Center 
for Public Policy Alternatives (Jan. 2013), http://cpparesearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/FOSTER-
Measurement-and-Implementation-of-Local-Content.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (suggesting that through 
the utility of the OGI, “local content has immense potential to transform the Nigerian economy”). 
85. Balouga, supra note 82, at 23. 
86. See Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality 
Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration, 15 (1) J. INT’L ECON. L. 223, 223-55 (2012) 
(arguing that the “proportionality analysis” in investment treaty arbitration recognizes the host State regulatory 
objective). 
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administration embarked upon an aggressive, ambitious and robust local content 
policy that ultimately led to the passage of Nigeria’s local content law by the 
National Assembly.87 However, the purpose and the text of any policy or 
legislative initiative in this direction may or may not be considered as a 
justifiable exercise of a valid host State regulatory objective in juxtaposition to 
the foreign investment treatment standards found in applicable BITs or 
investment agreements. 
2. Nigeria’s Current Local Content Legislation and Policy 
The LCA was passed by the Nigerian National Assembly on March 29, 2010. 
The Act became law on April 22, 2010 when Nigeria’s acting President, as he 
then was, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan signed the Bill into law.88 Though, the 
law was targeted at Nigeria’s OGI,89 its provisions appeared to apply to the 
entirety of the Nigerian economy because the title of the Act and some provisions 
shows clearly that the law is an Act enacted to provide for the Nigerian content 
development in the Nigerian economy and for matters connected therewith.90 The 
LCA established the Nigerian Content Development Agency (“NCDA”) to 
oversee and monitor the enforcement of the provisions of the law.91 Under the 
LCA, the Nigerian Content Development Management Board (“NCDMB”) was 
established to have overall control of the NCDA in carrying out its mandate 
under the LCA. The mandate of the NCDA includes designing a framework for 
the growth of the Nigerian content in the Nigerian economy through target 
setting and capacity building “while ensuring international competitiveness of the 
materials, equipment and services provided by Nigerian companies.”92 The 
capacity building initiatives of the NCDA entail making “[r]egulations to 
establish minimum standards, facilities, personnel and technology for training in 
a Nigerian Training Institute, and the Regulations shall specify modalities for 
 
87. See Mohammed S. Shehu & Hamisu Muhammad, Jonathan Signs Local Content Bill into Law, DAILY 
TRUST NEWSPAPERS (April 23, 2010). 
88. Id. 
89. At the signing ceremony of the Local Content Act, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan stated 
eloquently that the NCDMB “shall make procedures to guide , monitor, coordinate and implement [the Act] to 
ensure and enforce measurable and continuous growth of the Nigerian content in all oil and gas operations in 
the country”. Id. 
90. See, Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, § 2 (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
2010). A full text of the Act is available at http://www.placng.org/new/laws/NIGERIAN%20OIL%20AND% 
20GAS%20INDUSTRY%20CONTENT%20DEVELOPMENT%20ACT,%202010.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 
2015). 
91. Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, § 1(1) (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
2010). A full text of the Act is available at http://www.oandoplc.com/wp-content/uploads/Nigerian%20 
Content%20Act.pdf (last visited Sep. 19, 2013). 
92. Id. at § 2. 
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involving industry stakeholders as partners for development and managing of the 
institute”.93 
To be clear, the LCA was enacted to give preferential treatment to Nigerian 
companies with reference to opportunities and competition for investments in the 
Nigerian economy with particular emphasis on the OGI.94 According to Adeoye 
Adefulu, “in seeking to actualize its objectives [of the LCA], a number of 
instruments have been incorporated into the provisions of the NCA. These 
instruments include the requirements of exclusive consideration for indigenous 
companies in certain circumstances, first consideration for Nigerian companies 
and full and fair opportunity.”95 During the signing of the LCA, Shehu and 
Muhammad report that President Goodluck Jonathan gave a directive that, 
pursuant to the LCA, Nigerian indigenous service companies in the OGI should 
be given “exclusive consideration.”96 In fact, Section 26 of the LCA states: 
The Agency shall make Regulations with targets to ensure full utilization  
and steady growth of in-country capacity of Indigenous Oil, Gas and 
Services Companies engaged in Seismic Data Processing, Engineering 
Design, Reservoir Studies, manufacturing and fabrication equipment, 
Agriculture, Health, Science and Information Technology, Building, 
Construction, Transport Maritime etc. and other facilities for the Nigerian 
Economy.97 
III. FOREIGN INVESTMENT TREATMENT STANDARDS APPLICABLE IN NIGERIA’S 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 
The notion of “international minimum standards” as it were, in the treatment 
of foreign investments in the territory of the host State, have metamorphosed into 
a compendium of foreign investment treatment standards found in most BITs.98 
This became possible because of the failure of the concept of “international 
minimum standards” to attain the status of customary international law.99 Foreign 
investment treatment standards are now entrenched principles of international 
investment law through the proliferation of BITs in the last two decades. These 
 
93. Id. at § 21. 
94. Adeoye Adefulu, National Treatment & Nigeria’s New Local Content Legislation, (2010), 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/102400/international+trade+investment/National+Treatment+Nigerias+New+Local
+Content+Legislation (last visited Sep. 19, 2013). 
95. Id. 
96. Shehu & Muhammad, supra note 87. 
97. Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, supra note 90 at § 26 
98. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy and Interpretation 191-92 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
99. Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & 
TRADE 357, 359-60 (2005). 
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treatment standards form the core elements of BITs.100 The standards may be 
likened to assurances given by the State Parties for the protection of covered 
investments. Indeed, the evolution of investment treatment standards is consistent 
with the need for the protection of foreign investment in the host State. 
Investment treatment standards in most BITs may be drafted in the form of 
Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET”) of covered investments, Most-Favored- 
Nation (“MFN”) treatment and National Treatment (“NT”) of foreign 
investments in the host State. There is no established meaning of an FET  
standard even though it has been the subject of intense commentary by several 
arbitral Tribunals and scholars of investment treaty arbitration.101 It must be 
acknowledged that, the debate over the actual meaning of the phrase is beyond 
the scope of this article. However, it has been fairly established that it is one of 
the most common investment treatment standards found in the majority of 
BITs.102 At the very least, the phrase requires that the host State accords foreign 
investments in its territory a non-discriminatory treatment that may be considered 
fair and equitable. Whether or not a particular act or omission of the host State is 
unfair or inequitable with reference to covered investments has been the subject 
of varying interpretations in investment treaty arbitration.103 
On the precise meaning of the MFN treatment standard, Salacuse opines that 
the phrase means “a host country may not treat an investor or an investment from 
an investment treaty party less favorable than its own investors or investments 
from any other country”.104 Salacuse also describes the NT standard as a 
requirement in BITs that espouses the principle that the host State treats foreign 
investment and the investor “no less favorably than they treat their own 
nationals”.105 In whatever form the foreign investment treatment standards are 
drafted, the treatment standards connote or promote the principle of non-
discrimination in the conduct of FDI in the territory of the host State. The 
treatment standards are also in close accord to what may be referred to as the 
“reasonableness principle”. It has been suggested that the reasonableness 
principle “prohibits treatment [of foreign investment] that is arbitrary or 
motivated by political or discriminatory considerations.”106 
 
100. See Vandevelde, supra note 98. 
101. See, Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 
INT’L LAW 87, 87-106 (2005); Schreuer, supra note 99, 357-86; Barnali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? 
Defining Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 
297, 297-320 (2005) and UNCTC, Bilateral Investment Treaties, UN Doc ST/CTC/65, 41-45(1988). 
102. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 131 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
103. See id. at 131-32. 
104. Id. at 133. 
105. Id. 
106. See Vandevelde, supra note 98, at 189. 
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Nigeria’s BITs network is replete with varying forms of foreign investment 
treatment standards.107 As drafted, the phrases found in Nigeria’s BITs are also 
caught up in the ambiguity that may be associated with the true meaning of the 
treatment standards in the context of investment treaty arbitration. The most 
typical formulation of the foreign investment treatment standards is found in the 
UK-Nigeria BIT.108 Article 3 appears to be a combination of provisions for MFN 
and NT treatment standards. The Article provides: 
(1) Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investment or 
returns of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to 
treatment less favorable than that which it accords to investments or 
returns of its own nationals or companies or to investment or returns of 
nationals or companies of any third State. 
(2) Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject nationals or 
companies of the other Contracting Party, as regards their management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, to 
treatment less favorable than that which it accords to its own nationals or 
companies or to nationals or companies of any third State. 
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this 
Article, either Contracting Party may grant to its own nationals and 
companies special incentives in order to stimulate the creation of local 
industries, provided they do not significantly affect the investment and 
activities of nationals and companies of the other Contracting Party in 
connection with an investment.109 
The Nigeria-UK BIT did not expressly provide for the FET treatment 
standard for foreign investments in the territory of the host State.110 The text of 
the preceding provisions in the Nigeria-UK BIT did not address any relationship 
nor is there any interpretative language that may be suggestive of the fact that, 
the FET standard may be interpreted as part of the NT or MFN clauses in the 
Article under reference.111 Thus, is it possible that consideration for FET could be 
incorporated by arbitral Tribunals as part of the interpretation of the 
reasonableness principle? How is the consideration of any alleged conduct or 
 
107. See Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Kingdom 
of The Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Nigeria, art. 6, Nov. 2, 1992, 2240 UNTS 341. [hereinafter 
Netherlands-Nigeria BIT], http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779 (last visited Mar. 6, 
2013). 
108. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 11, 1990, 
1658 UNTS 523. [hereinafter UK-Nigeria BIT]. 
109. Id. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
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omission of the host State determined, that is sought by an investor to be 
characterized as discriminatory, unfair or unjust to covered investments? The 
approaches to these questions by arbitral Tribunals have not been unanimous.112 
In some cases, the FET standard has been treated as a norm of customary 
international law in the process of considering the NT or MFN treatment 
standards. Other arbitral Tribunals have espoused the view, that it is needless to 
consider any relationship of FET treatment standard to other foreign investment 
treatment standards in the absence of any specific language to that effect in the 
applicable BIT or investment agreement under review. 
In Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, the investment dispute in this ICSID arbitration arose over the 
construction of a motorway in Pakistan.113 The National Highway Authority 
(“NHA”) of Pakistan, a government agency controlled by the government of 
Pakistan, planned the construction of a six-lane motor highway.114 The Claimant 
is a Turkish company engaged in the business of construction of motor highways 
and other infrastructural projects within and outside Turkey.115 The NHA and the 
claimant entered into an agreement for the construction of the proposed highway 
of the NHA.116 The investment dispute, subject matter of the ICSID arbitration, 
arose over the notice of termination of contract served by NHA on the 
Claimant.117 The Claimant commenced ICSID arbitration.118 In its request for 
arbitration, the Claimant alleged inter alia, that the unlawful acts and omission of 
Pakistan with reference to the agreement for the construction of the highway 
contract adversely affected its investments in Pakistan.119 As part of the 
consideration of the claims of the Claimant, the arbitral Tribunal considered the 
FET treatment standard obligation of Pakistan in the context of the circumstances 
leading to the investment dispute.120 The arbitral Tribunal appeared to 
characterize the FET standard as a general obligation.121 In an attempt to define 
the nature of the FET standard in this regard, the arbitral Tribunal interpreted the 
analysis of prior Tribunals to mean that the FET standard obligation of the host 
State means that the standard: 
. . . comprise the obligation to act transparently and grant due process, to 
refrain from taking arbitrary or discriminatory measures, from exercising 
 
112. See infra discussion of various tribunals. 
113. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/29, Award, (Aug. 27, 2009). 
114. Id. ¶ 9. 
115. Id. ¶ 2-3. 
116. Id. ¶ 11. 
117. Id. ¶ 37-44. 
118. Id. ¶ 42. 
119. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶ 47. 
120. Id.at ¶ 113, 146-182. 
121. Id. at ¶ 176. 
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coercion or from frustrating the investor’s reasonable expectations with 
respect to the legal framework affecting the investment. 122 
It is noteworthy, that in its analysis of the true import of the FET treatment 
standard, this arbitral Tribunal based its reasoning on the need for the host State 
to avoid discriminatory acts, arbitrariness and any act that will unreasonably 
frustrate the benefits of covered investments in the applicable BIT or investment 
agreement. Based on the reasoning of the Bayindir Tribunal, in an investment 
arbitration proceeding where it is alleged that the host State has treated the 
covered investments arbitrarily or in a manner that appears to violate the MFN or 
NT clause, an arbitral Tribunal may wittingly or unwittingly embark on a 
consideration of the FET treatment standard as general obligation intended to fill 
any vacuum left by provisions for other specific foreign investment treatment 
standards. Citing Tecnicas Medioambientales Techmed SA v. United Mexican 
States,123 the Bayindir Tribunal went on to say that emphasis must be placed on 
the facts of the particular case in the consideration of the FET standard.124 The 
Tribunal specifically adopted the ruling of another arbitral Tribunal that the FET 
treatment standard “must be adapted to the circumstances of each case.”125 
This approach may be founded in the reasonableness principle that abhors 
any form of discrimination or arbitrariness against covered investments. Dolzer 
and Schreuer explain that, the FET standard is intended “to fill gaps that may be 
left by the more specific standards” to guarantee the level of protection of 
investments anticipated by BITs.126 On their part, McLachlan, Shore and 
Weiniger, argued that the FET standard is the plank upon which international law 
considers, “the adequacy of treatment meted out to a foreign investor by the 
judicial and administrative agencies of the host State. It reflects treatments which 
all civilized nations should accord to their citizens as well as aliens.”127 
In view of the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that, in spite of any express 
provisions under Article 3 of the Nigeria-UK BIT, considerations for the FET 
treatment standard may be incorporated in the interpretation of Article 3 of the 
Nigeria-UK BIT.128 This conclusion speaks to the extent of Nigeria’s likely 
liability in a potential investment claim under this BIT in the context of the 
application and administration of the LCA. Liability is likely, where a domestic 
 
122. Id. ¶ 178. 
123. Technicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB/ (AF)/00/02, Award, 
(May 29, 2003). 
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125. See Waste Management, Inc v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/AF/003, Award, ¶ 99 
(Apr. 3, 2004). 
126. See Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 122-23 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2012). 
127. CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION ¶ 7.178 (2007). 
128. See id. at notes 121-27 (for discussion of FET interpretation). 
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regulatory or legislative objective designed for the promotion of economic 
development conflicts with Nigeria’s obligations created by the treatment 
standards of covered investments. Most especially, it is likely, where a breach of 
the foreign investment treatment standards that may be inclusive of the FET 
treatment standard could be considered as violated by legislative or 
administrative policy initiatives that adversely interfere with the rights of the 
foreign investor under an applicable BIT. As such, the FET treatment standard in 
particular could be applied to domestic legislative initiatives, administrative 
decision-making processes or judicial decisions to determine whether there was a 
fair decision making process or there was an omission to accord due process to 
the interests of the foreign investor. The effect would likely be that, if considered 
alongside with other specific treatment standards, the considerations of the FET 
treatment standard might offer a higher level of protection of foreign investments 
than other specific foreign investment treatment standards. 
Conversely, in MTD Equity Sendirian Berhad v. Republic of Chile, the 
Tribunal concluded that because there was no reference to customary 
international law in the BIT under consideration in relation to the FET treatment 
standard, there was no basis for the Tribunal to specifically address that 
relationship.129 According to the arbitral Tribunal, “[t]his being a Tribunal 
established under the BIT, it is obliged to apply the provisions of the BIT and 
interpret them in accordance with the norms of interpretation established by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is binding on the State Parties 
to the BIT”.130 The Claimant in this case was a Malaysian company that signed a 
Foreign Investment Contract (“FIC”) with an agency of the government of Chile. 
The FIC was an agreement for the development and construction of a self-
sufficient satellite city with houses, apartments for diverse socio-economic strata, 
schools, hospitals, and universities, commerce of all sorts, services, and all other 
components necessary for self-sufficiency.131 The investment dispute arose when 
the investment project subject matter of the FIC was rejected through an agency 
of the Chilean government for conflict with existing urban development policy 
and was no longer supported by the local authority.132 The rejection of the project 
occurred after the Claimant had made approved substantial investment towards 
the project.133 The Claimant commenced ICSID arbitration pursuant to the 
Malaysia-Chile BIT.134 In its request for arbitration, the Malaysian company 
claimed that, the Respondent violated the FIC for failure to grant the necessary 
 
129. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award  (May 25, 2004), 





134. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Malay.-Chile, Nov. 11, 1992, WIPO 
Lex No. TRT/CL-MY/001 (entered into force Aug. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Malaysia-Chile BIT]. 
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permits for the Claimant to carry out their investments. It is instructive to note 
that the Claimant based their claims in part on Article 3(1) of the Denmark-Chile 
BIT135 and Article 3(3) and (4) of the Chile-Croatia BIT.136 The Tribunal accepted 
the memorial of the Claimants that was based on the MFN clause in the 
Malaysia-Chile BIT; the pertinent Articles in the Chile-Denmark BIT and the 
Chile-Croatia BIT are applicable to the instant arbitration proceedings.137 This 
arbitral Tribunal reached its conclusion above, by reviewing the question whether 
the obligations of the Chilean government under the Denmark-Chile and the 
Chile-Croatian BIT to award permits after the approval of  covered investments 
can be considered a violation of the FET treatment standard.138 The arbitral 
Tribunal’s conclusion was the result of its examination of the meaning of FET 
treatment standard with reference to the text of the Malaysia-Chile BIT.139 
Furthermore, whether or not one agrees with the conclusion that the FET 
treatment standard may be considered broadly in connection with other specific 
foreign investment treatment standards with reference to potential foreign 
investments in Nigeria’s OGI, it is contended that the FET treatment standard 
may still be applicable under the UK-Nigeria BIT by virtue of Article 3(2) of the 
BIT. Article 3(2) of the UK-Nigeria BIT makes it possible for a Claimant to base 
their request for arbitration on the provisions of other BITs between Nigeria and 
any third State Party.140 Thus, pertinent provisions of the BITs between Nigeria 
and other third State Parties become applicable by operation of the foreign 
investment treatment standards under the UK-Nigeria BIT with respect to 
potential investments disputes that may arise under the UK-Nigeria BIT.141 In the 
 
135. Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Chile-Den., art. 
3(1), May 28, 1993, WIPO Lex No. TRT/CL-DK/001 (entered into force Nov. 30 1995) [hereinafter Denmark-
Chile BIT] provides: 
Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy full protection and security in the 
territory of the Other Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in anyway impair by 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal 
of investments in its territory of investors of the other Contracting Party. Each Contracting Party 
shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments of investors of the 
other Contracting Party. 
136. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Chile-Croat., art. 3(3), Nov. 
28, 1994, WIPO Lex No. TRT/CL-HR/001 (entered into force Nov. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Chile-Croatia BIT] 
provides: “Each Contracting Party shall protect within its territory investments made in accordance with its laws 
and regulations by investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, extension, sale and liquidation of such 
investments.” 
137. Article 3(1) of the Malaysia-Chile BIT provides inter alia: “Investments made by investors of either 
Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall receive the treatment which is fair and 
equitable, and not less favorable than that accorded to investments made by investors of any third State.” 
Malaysia-Chile BIT, supra note 134, at art. 3(1). 
138. See MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd., 44 I.L.M. 91 (2005). 
139. Id. 
140. UK-Nigeria BIT, supra note 108. 
141. See MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd, supra note 138, at §100-03. 
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context of the UK-Nigeria BIT and by extension Nigeria’s international 
investment regime, the connection of the FET treatment standard is further 
established by virtue of the provisions of the Netherlands-Nigeria BIT.142 Article 
3 of the Netherlands-Nigeria BIT provides thus: 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment of 
the investments of nationals of the other Contracting Party and shall not 
impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures, the operation, 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by those 
nationals. 
(2) More particularly, each Contracting Party shall accord to such 
investments full physical security and protection which in any case shall 
not be less than that accorded either to investments of its own nationals 
or to investments of nationals of any third State, whichever is more 
favorable to the national concerned.143 
Consequently, Article 3(2) of the UK-Nigeria BIT incorporates the 
provisions of Article 3(1) and (2) of the Netherlands-Nigeria BIT in the 
interpretation of the foreign investment treatment standards contained in Article 3 
of the UK-Nigeria BIT. Thus, the FET treatment standard can be interpreted to 
be part of the foreign investment treatment standards under the UK-Nigeria BIT. 
Arbitral practice has been fairly consistent in the incorporation of the 
consideration of the FET treatment standard in the determination of the scope of 
other specific treatment standards contained in BITs where applicable by 
operation of the latter. For example, in MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd.,144 the Tribunal 
held that the provisions of the Chile-Croatia BIT and the Denmark-Chile BIT, 
which deal with the obligation to award permits pursuant to approved foreign 
investment and fulfillment of contractual obligations connected thereto, can be 
considered to be part of the FET standard by operation of the specific treatment 
standards in the Malaysia-Chile BIT subject matter of the ICSID arbitration 
instituted by the Claimant in that investment arbitration.145 
It is noteworthy that the Netherlands-Nigeria BIT, unlike the Nigeria-UK 
BIT, also linked the FET treatment standard with the reasonableness principle 
prohibiting any impairment of the enjoyment of the benefit of foreign 
investments through unreasonable or discriminatory measures of the host State. 
Article 3(2) of the Netherlands-Nigeria BIT requires that the host State shall 
accord full protection and security to foreign investments.146 This way, the 
 
142. Netherlands-Nigeria BIT, supra note 107, at art. 3. 
143. Id. 
144. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd., supra note 138, at ¶ 101-04. 
145. Id. 
146. Netherlands-Nigeria BIT, supra note 107, at art. 3. 
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Nigeria-Netherlands BIT refers to the FET treatment standard in connection with 
what appears to be the MFN or NT treatment standards. It may be argued that, 
any link created between the FET treatment standard, full protection and security 
of foreign investments, and other specific treatment standards creates the 
opportunity for broad application of the FET treatment standard in investment 
treaty arbitration. Indeed, it has been reported that, the “[t]ribunals applying the 
fair and equitable treatment standard have held that the standard embraces 
principles of reasonableness, consistency, (in effect, the security of legitimate 
expectations), non-discrimination, transparency, and due process”.147 At the same 
time, specific foreign investment treatment standards like the NT or the MFN 
treatment standard may include legitimate exceptions that may include tax or 
other regional economic agreements of the host State with a third State Party.148 
Such exceptions are usually circumvented by the invocation of the FET standard 
that provides a higher level of protection under the reasonableness principle less 
than the NT or MFN foreign investment treatment standards. But, Vandevelde 
argued in contrast that, “the same result could occur under the standard 
prohibiting unreasonable or discriminatory measures and thus the seeming 
inconsistency in prohibiting under one standard the very conduct that is permitted 
under another is not solely attributable to the breadth of the fair and equitable 
standard.”149 
The debate over the scope of the FET treatment standard and its relationship 
with other foreign investment treatment standards has valid points on both side of 
the aisle. The issue may not be unconnected with the lack of any precise meaning 
or variations of the FET treatment standard in BITs. Over time, the precise scope, 
interpretation and application of the FET treatment standard are likely to be 
resolved by the progressive development of international investment law. 
However, as a salient feature of Nigeria’s international investment regime, the 
interpretation of the FET treatment standard in isolation or in connection with 
other foreign investment treatment standards can create potential liability for 
Nigeria because of the discriminatory underpinnings embedded in the LCA. 
Now let us return to the implication of the BNC for United States and other 
foreign investors in Nigeria’s OGI whose home countries have no valid BIT with 
Nigeria. Consent to investment arbitration by Nigeria within the framework of 
multilateral investment treaties creates implication for the country vis-à-vis the 
application and administration of the LCA. For this reason, Nigeria’s generic 
offer to arbitrate foreign investment claims within the framework of the ICSID 
Convention with any foreign investor whose home country is also a party to the 
ICSID Convention, is implicated in the LCA with respect to the procedural and 
substantive rights of foreign investors in the OGI. Section 26 (2) (b) of the NIPC 
 
147. Vandevelde, supra note 98, at 202-203. 
148. See, e.g., Netherlands-Nigeria BIT, supra note 107, at art. 3(3). 
149. Vandevelde, supra note 98, at 203. 
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Act,150 provides an unconditional consent to international arbitration “within the 
framework of any bilateral or multilateral” treaty to which Nigeria is a party. 
The ICSID Convention is a multilateral investment treaty which Nigeria has 
ratified.151 Thus, Ekwueme’s argument that on the basis of Section 26(2) (b) of 
the NIPC Act, a foreign investor whose home country is not a party to any BIT 
with Nigeria can arbitrate investment claims against Nigeria is legitimate, valid, 
and convincing.152 The intellectual foundation of Ekwueme’s persuasive 
argument is the ICSID arbitration case of SPP v. Arab Republic of Egypt.153 As 
part of the arbitration proceedings, this arbitral Tribunal considered and 
interpreted a provision of Egyptian law154 that is substantially similar to Section 
26 (2) (b) of the NIPC Act.155 In this regard, the Respondent in the SPP case 
contended that this aspect of its law is not self-executing but requires a separate 
agreement before the investor could institute ICSID arbitration.156 The arbitral 
Tribunal rejected the contention of the Respondent and explained that, “[t] o 
interpret the phrases “within the framework of the ICSID Convention” and 
“where it applies” to mean that the parties to an investment dispute must execute 
a separate agreement to establish consent to the Center’s jurisdiction . . . would 
render meaningless the entire phrase . . . no valid method of legal interpretation 
would warrant the conclusion that the express preference to the Convention is 
meaningless or pleonastic.”157 
 
150. Section 26(2)(b) of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Act provides: 
(2) Any dispute between an investor and any Government of the Federation in respect of an 
enterprise to which this Act applies which is not amicably settled may be submitted at the option of 
the aggrieved party to arbitration as follows: 
(b) In the case of a foreign investor, within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral 
agreement on investment protection to which the Federal Government and the country of 
which the investor is a national are parties’. 
Investment Promotion Act (2004) Cap. (N117), § 26(2)(b) (Nigeria). 
151. ICSID, LIST OF CONTRACTING STATES AND OTHER SIGNATORIES OF THE CONVENTION (2014), 
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=Show 
Document&language=English. 
152. See Khrushchev U. K. Ekwueme, Nigeria’s Principal Investment Laws in the Context of 
International Law, 49 (2) J. AFR. L. 193, 199-201 (2005). 
153. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (Nov. 27, 1985), 3 ICSID Rep. 101 (1995); see Ekwueme, supra note 153, 
at 200. 
154. Law No. 43 of 1974, art. 8 (Egypt), as cited in Ekwueme provides: 
Investment disputes in respect of the implementation of this Law are to be settled in a manner to be 
agreed upon with the investor, or within the framework of the agreements in force between the Arab 
Republic of Egypt and the investor’s home country, or within the framework of the Convention for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between the States and the nationals of other countries to 
which Egypt has adhered by virtue of Law no. 90 of 1971, where (i.e., the Convention) applies. 
Ekwueme, supra note 153, at 200. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd., 3 ICSID Rep. at ¶ 94. 
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It is very likely that the obligation of the host State in the recognition of the 
FET standard in the conduct of foreign investments would be a reoccurring 
decimal in the interpretation of the foreign investment treatment standards 
embedded in Nigeria’s international investment law regime. Mann was 
convincing when he submitted that “ . . . the right to fair and equitable treatment 
goes much further than the right to most-favoured- nation and to national 
treatment . . . and it may well be that . . . provisions of the Agreements affording 
substantive protection are no more than examples or specific instances of this 
overriding duty”.158 More often than not, arbitral practice on the analysis of the 
foreign investment treatment standards is tied to the question whether or not the 
host-State has validly made a regulatory policy objective.159 From the standpoint 
of the host-States like Nigeria, the regulatory objective is often geared towards 
considerations and policies that may promote economic development of the host 
State. 160 
There is the absence of a consensus on the parameters for the exercise of the 
host-State regulatory objective or on what may be tantamount to arbitrariness and 
discriminatory measures against foreign investments. But there appears to be a 
common ground in arbitral practice that the host State may be held liable if a case 
of discrimination could be made based on the circumstances and facts of each 
case.161 In Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, an investment 
arbitration that arose under the I976 UNCITRAL Rules, the Tribunal held that 
“[t]he standard of “reasonableness” has no different meaning in this context than 
in the context of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard with which it is 
associated and the same is true with the standard of “non-discrimination”.162 The 
Saluka arbitral Tribunal went on to say that “[t]he standard of “reasonableness” 
therefore requires, in this context as well, a showing that the State’s conduct 
bears a reasonable relationship to some rational policy, whereas the standard of 
“non-discrimination” requires a rational justification of any differential treatment 
of a foreign investor.”163 However, in the context of the theme of this article, an 
assessment of the LCA would include an analysis of the meaning of “investment” 
in the OGI in the context of international investment law. 
 
158. Francis A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1981 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 241, 243. 
159. See Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, THE MATTER OF AN 
ARBITRATION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW RULE S 1976 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL], Partial Award, ¶ 458-461 (Mar. 17, 2006). See also S D Myers, Inc. v. Government of 
Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 263-264 (Nov. 13, 2000). 
160. See supra Part I. 
161. Salkula Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, at ¶ 464. 
162. Id. at ¶ 460. 
163. Id. 
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IV. THE APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF “INVESTMENT” UNDER NIGERIAN 
AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW REGIMES 
Nigeria’s ratification of the ICSID Convention necessitates substantial 
reference to ICSID arbitral practice under this heading for two reasons. Firstly, 
foreign investors mostly prefer the ICSID Convention’s investment dispute 
resolution mechanism through the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes investment arbitration Rules (ICSID) in instances where 
consent to ICSID arbitration is available.164 Secondly, there is an open offer and 
consent to ICSID arbitration under Nigeria’s international investment regime 
whether or not the foreign investor’s home country is a party to the ICSID 
Convention.165 
The national definition of “investment” in the context of international 
investment law is usually found in the host State’s international investment law 
regime. Generally, the regime may include the consent to investment arbitration 
through a multilateral investment treaty, BITs, or the national investment code 
for the conduct of international investments. In other words, the combination of 
the variables of consent to investment arbitration, BITs and national investment 
codes adds to the make-up of the host State’s international investment 
framework. The definition of “investment” under Nigerian law is relevant 
because of the combined effect of Nigeria’s consent to investment arbitration 
within the framework of the ICSID Convention and Section 25 (2) (b) of the 
NIPC Act mentioned above.166 However, where there is a conflict between a 
national investment code and an applicable international investment agreement in 
the definition of “investment,” the meaning of the term in the international 
agreement will prevail in the adjudication of the investment dispute.167 This 
consideration is often influenced by the notion that the international investment 
agreement offers better protection of foreign investments. Damrosch et al notes 
that “international tribunals have sometimes declared municipal legislations to be 
subject to international obligations.”168 The authors’ observation might be based 
on the theory that the State is bound to give effect to the principles of 
international law.169 Similarly, consideration for the investment of private 
international capital in the host State may be influenced by the assurances in 
 
164. Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in 
the Road, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENTS & TRADE 231, 231(2005) (stating that “[m]ost BITs refer to ICSID”). 
165. Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act (1995) Decree No. (16) Chapter N117, § 26(2)(b) 
(Nigeria) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria [hereinafter The NIPC Act], available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/Nigerian%20Investment%20Promotion%20Commission%20Act.htm.  
166. Id. 
167. Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 66-88 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Reports 389; see Lori F. Damrosch et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 161 (West Group, St. Paul 4d ed. 2001). 
168. Damrosch et al, supra note 167. 
169. Id. at 159. 
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place for the protection of foreign investments. The assurances for the protection 
of investment may be useless, ambiguous or ineffective in the absence of a 
definition of “investment” that incorporates the protected investment. 
A.  The Definition of “Investment” Under Nigerian Law 
The NIPC Act established the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
(NIPC) as a “one-stop agency” and a government liaison agency between the 
government and foreign investors.170 Section 31 of the NIPC Act defines 
“investment” as: 
“investment” made to acquire an interest in an enterprise operating 
within and outside the economy of Nigeria.171 
Investment by foreign investors in any enterprise operating outside Nigeria 
cannot qualify as an “investment” in the context of FDI that should be in the 
territory of the host State. The above definition of “investment” is amorphous 
because the meaning of “investment” under the NIPC Act extends to foreign 
investment outside the territory of Nigeria. The definition may have been drafted 
to capture a broad meaning of “investment” within the framework of 
international investment law with reference to Nigeria. It could be argued that the 
provision of Section 4 (c) of the NIPC Act to “promote investments in and 
outside Nigeria through effective promotional means” covers investment outside 
Nigeria,172 but that section is a mandate to the NIPC to utilize promotional means 
within and outside of Nigeria to attract FDI into the Nigerian economy. 
Therefore, Section 4 (c) of the NIPC Act does not justify the current definition of 
“investment” under Nigerian law that may give credence to the suggestion that 
the NIPC Act protects investments outside the territory of Nigeria. 
The NIPC Act established the NIPC to “encourage and promote investment 
in the Nigerian economy; and matters connected therewith” (emphasis added).173 
Furthermore, the notion of foreign investment under international investment 
law, at a minimum, entails the direct importation of capital into the host State.174 
This is the basis of private international investment. It is contended that a 
Nigerian investor who invests overseas is not guaranteed any protection under 
the NIPC Act with reference to ICSID arbitration under section 26 (2) (b) of the 
NIPC Act. The nature of a foreign investment dispute is described as “one 
 
170. NIPC Act, supra note 165, at § 1 Preamble; Khrushchev U. K. Ekwueme, Nigeria’s Principal 
Investment Laws in the Context of International Law, 49 (2) JAL 177, 185 (2005). 
171. NIPC Act, supra note 165, at § 31. 
172. Id. at § 4(c). 
173. Id. at § 1 Preamble. 
174. See Robert E. Lipsey, Home-and Host-Country Effects of Foreign Direct Investment, CHALLENGES 
TO GLOBALIZATION: ANALYZING THE ECONOMICS 333, 334 (Robert E. Baldwin and L Alan Winters eds., 
Chicago Univ. Press 2004). 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
283 
between an investor from one country and a government that . . . relates to an 
investment in the host country”.175 In other words, under the international 
investment law regime, a foreign investment is envisaged to be an investment in 
the territory of the host State, not outside it. Garcia-Bolivar appears to address 
the nature of foreign investment persuasively when he declares 
. . . a range of strategies is often adopted by States to attract that capital, a 
key one of which is enhancing the domestic investment climate through 
entering into international legal instruments that provide protection to 
foreign investment. In concluding international investment agreement 
(IIAs), States agree to grant international protection to foreign 
investments—and, in return they expect to attract the capital needed to 
promote their economic development. For host States, this assumption is 
a central, if often unarticulated, rationale behind the conclusion of the 
agreement . . . This understanding could, in turn, influence the 
interpretation of the IIAs’ provisions under international law.176 
Furthermore, the definition of “investment” under the NIPC Act may be in 
conflict with the basic requirements of Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention 
with reference to the meaning of the term under Nigerian law. Article 25 (1) of 
the ICSID Convention defines the jurisdiction of the Center thus: 
The jurisdiction of the Center shall extend to any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any 
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the 
Centre by the State) and a national of another Contracting State, which 
the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. 
When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its 
consent unilaterally.177 
The premise of Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention, with reference to the 
meaning “investment,” envisages foreign investment in the territory of the host 
State. Thus, it may be difficult for an arbitral Tribunal to make a determination of 
an “investment” based on the way Section 31 of the NIPC Act is drafted, 
particularly where a BIT is inapplicable and the existence of an “investment” is 
determined by the interpretation of national law such as the NIPC Act. As a 
result, the definition of “investment” under Nigerian law invites reform. The 
 
175. R. Doak Bishop, James Crawford & W. Michael Reisman, FOREIGN INVESMENT DISPUTES: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 9 (Kluwer Law International 2005). 
176. Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, Economic development at the core of the international investment law 
regime, EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 586, 587 (Chester Brown and Kate Miles 
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). 
177. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 
Article 25(1), Oct. 14, 1966, ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules. 
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need for reform also finds support in the case of Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech 
Republic,178 where the Tribunal took the view that an “investment” must be in 
conformity with the host State’s law, and there must be a deliberate inquiry by 
the arbitration Tribunal to make that determination.179 
The intention of the Nigerian draftsmen might have been to provide a 
broader definition of “investment” that extended to any conceivable economic 
activity, because the same section of the NIPC Act defines “enterprise” as: 
an industry, project, undertaking or business to which this Act applies or 
an expansion of that industry, undertaking, project or business or any 
part of that industry, undertaking , project or business and, where there is 
foreign participation, means such an enterprise duly registered with the 
Commission.180 
Either way, Ekwueme181 was swift to embrace this definition of “investment” 
as being advantageous in the Nigerian context. He argues that, the amorphous 
definition of “investment” under the NIPC Act creates a unique flexibility that 
would facilitate and accommodate the excogitating nature of investment.182 As a 
result, re-investment returns on foreign investment satisfy the requirement of 
“investment” under the NIPC Act. 
A different definition of “investment” is found in BITs entered between 
Nigeria and other countries. For example, Article 1 () of the BIT between Turkey 
and Nigeria defines ‘investment’ as follows: 
The term “investment” means every kind of asset, connected with 
business activities, acquired for the purpose of establishing lasting 
economic relations in the territory of a Contracting Party in conformity 
with its laws and regulations . . . 
This Agreement shall apply to investments in the territory of one Contracting 
Party, made in accordance with its national laws and regulations, by investors of 
the other Contracting Party, whether prior to, or after the entry into force of the 
 
178. Phoenix Action Ltd v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, (Apr. 9, 2009). 
179. Id. at 100-105; See also Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Philippines, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, (Aug. 16, 2007) (following this principle, the Tribunal held as follows: 
“[w]ith respect to a Bilateral Investment Treaty that defines “investment,” it is possible that an economic 
transaction that might qualify factually and financially as an investment (i.e. be comprised of capital imported 
by a foreign entity into the economy of another state which is a party to a BIT ) falls, nonetheless, outside the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal established under the pertinent BIT, because legally it is not an investment within the 
meaning of the BIT. This will occur when the transaction that might otherwise qualify as an “investment” fails 
ratione temporis . . . or fails rationae personae . . . It will also occur when the transaction fails to qualify 
rationae materiae . . . “). 
180. NIPC Act, supra note 165, at § 31. 
181. Ekwueme, supra note 170, at 181. 
182. Id. 
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present Agreement. However, this Agreement shall not apply to any disputes that 
have arisen before its entry into force.183 
Similarly, the BIT between Nigeria and the United Kingdom defines 
“investment” for the purpose of this agreement as “every kind of asset and in 
particular, though not exclusively . . . “ in the territory of the contracting 
parties.184 There are legitimate arguments against the propriety of the definition of 
“investment” that may be applicable to Nigerian OGI. The Salini criteria 
espoused through the mechanism of ICSID appears to be the first major attempt 
to define “investment” in ICSID arbitral practice. 
B. A Brief Analysis of the Salini Criteria 
The Tribunal in the case of Salini Construttori S.P.A and Italstrade S.P.A. v. 
Kingdom of Morocco185 was the second arbitral Tribunal to consider and apply 
the criteria articulated by Schreuer.186 This Tribunal’s attempt to define 
“investment” appears to have elevated the “typical characteristics” approach of 
the Fedax Tribunal187 to a precise and distinct jurisdictional requirement. This 
might be the reason why Schreuer, upon whose thesis the decision was based, 
cautioned that the Salini “criteria should not be seen as distinct jurisdictional 
requirements each of which must be met separately” with reference to the 
definition of investment.188 Schreuer’s cautious admonition was necessitated by 
the frustration expressed by some arbitral Tribunals that, as a practical matter, 
“the criteria that they applied were interrelated and should be looked at not in 
isolation but in conjunction.”189 
In this case, Salini, an Italian company, entered into an agreement with the 
Kingdom of Morocco in August 1994 for the construction of a highway joining 
Rabat to Fes, which is approximately 50 kilometers long.190 The works, subject 
matter of the contract, was completed in October 1998, but it took 4 months 
longer than stipulated in the contract (32 months).191 The Minister of 
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Infrastructure of the Kingdom of Morocco rejected the financial claims of 
Salini.192 Salini, in its request for arbitration based the jurisdiction of the Center 
under Article 8 of the Treaty between the Government of the Kingdom of 
Morocco and the Government of Italy for the reciprocal promotion and 
protection of investments.193 The Kingdom of Morocco contended that the 
contract in question did not constitute an “investment” within the meaning of the 
ICSID Convention, arguing that the grounds of the claim in the ICSID arbitration 
did not constitute the violations of the applicable BIT.194 The Kingdom of 
Morocco added that the alleged violations, the basis of the ICSID arbitration, 
were at best ordinary contractual breaches that do not fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal.195 
According to the Kingdom of Morocco, contractual breaches ought to be 
dealt with by reference to the laws and regulations of the host State.196 The 
Claimant also contended that the ICSID Convention is applicable to the 
investment dispute, alleging that the nature of the contract and its 
characterization brings it within the framework of the ICSID Convention based 
on the consent of the parties.197 The Claimant argued that the reference to the host 
State law in this case was only a means to realize the “investment” and not to 
define it.198 The Tribunal also considered the issue of a State entity on the ground 
that the question might have considerable influence on the merits of the case.199 
The Tribunal then examined the consent of the parties in the context of the ICSID 
Convention.200 However, in its consideration of the definition of “investment” 
pursuant to the ICSID Convention, the Tribunal noted that its jurisdiction arises 
from the consent of the parties, which must be given in writing in accordance 
with the ICSID Convention. 201 Faced with limited ICSID precedents on the 
definition of “investment”, except for the approach adopted in the Fedax arbitral 
Tribunal, this Tribunal drew inspiration from the scholarly work of Schreuer and 
the guidance of the commentary of Shihata and Para202 and defined “investment” 
in the context of the ICSID Convention.  
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In the process, the Salini Tribunal found that: 
There have been almost no cases where the notion of investment within 
the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention was raised. However, it 
would be inaccurate to consider that the requirement that a dispute be “in 
direct relation to an investment” is diluted by the consent of the 
Contracting States. To the contrary, ICSID case law and legal authors 
agree that the investment requirement must be respected as an objective 
condition of the jurisdiction of the Center . . . The doctrine generally 
considers that investment infers: Contributions, certain duration of 
performance of the contract and participation in the risks of the 
transaction. In reading the Convention’s preamble, one may add the 
contribution to the economic development of the host State as an 
additional condition. In reality, these various elements may be 
interdependent. Thus, the risks of the transaction may depend on the 
contribution and duration of the performance of the contract. As a result 
these various criteria should be assessed globally, even if, for the sake of 
reasoning the Tribunal considers them individually here.203 
Proponents describe the Salini Criteria as an objective approach that supports 
the proposition that “investment” under the ICSID Convention has a standard 
meaning that is discernible following the criteria.204 This way, the criteria created 
what might be cumulative requirements that might establish an “investment” for 
the purpose of the ICSID Convention.205 In other words, the Salini criteria 
articulate “a formal jurisdictional requirement” or a “jurisdictional approach” to 
the definition of “investment” for the purposes of Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention.206 The Malaysian Historical Salvors arbitral Tribunal attempted to 
distinguish the “typical characteristics approach” and the “jurisdictional 
requirements approach” espoused by the Fedax/Salini Tribunals. 207 According to 
this arbitral Tribunal, based on the Salini criteria, there are certain hallmarks in a 
transaction that must be present before it can be considered as an “investment”.208 
In contrast, the “typical characteristics approach” of the Fedax Tribunal may not 
lead to the determination of an “investment” where one or more of the 
 
203. Salini Construttori S.P.A., ARB/00/4 ¶ 52. 
204. Richard Happ & Noah Rubins, DIGEST OF ICSID AWARDS AND DECISIONS 2003–2007 341-42 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
205. Id. (The authors noted that the Salini “criteria have been used frequently during the 2003-2007 
period as an indicator that an investment exists for ICSID purposes”). 
206. Antoine Martin, Definition of “Investment”: Could a Persistent Objector to the Salini Tests be 
Found in ICSID Arbitral Practice?, 11 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 1 (2011). 
207. Malaysian Historical Salvors, SBN, BHD v. Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, 
¶ 70 (May 17, 2007). 
208. Id. ¶ 70. 
2015 / Economic Development and the Utility of Local Content Legislation 
288 
established hallmarks are absent.209 Based on this analysis of the distinction 
between the Fedax/Salini criteria, the Malaysian Historical Salvors Tribunal 
dismissed the differences between the two approaches.210 The Tribunal based its 
reasoning on the premise that “[t]he classical Salini hallmarks are not a punch list 
of items, which if completely checked off, will automatically lead to a conclusion 
that there is an investment.”211 Williams and Foote did not support the 
prescriptive analysis adopted by this Tribunal.212 Instead the authors opined that, 
“[t]he Malaysian Salvors tribunal’s approach arguably stopped short of the so-
called jurisdictional approach . . . At least, however, it appears to elevate the 
Fedax/Salini criteria to a presumption.”213 The authors hinged their skepticism on 
the theory that “no one prospective investment is likely to be exactly as 
another.”214 The authors then wondered whether such an approach is “appropriate 
where the possible features of financial commitment by Claimants are as infinite 
as the field of human endeavor.”215 
Critics of the “jurisdictional requirements approach” made famous by the 
Salini Tribunal, advocate a subjective approach that recognizes and upholds the 
consent and agreement of the State party and investor in the definition of 
“investment” as understood under the ICSID Convention.216 In this regard, 
subjectivity juxtaposed with the input of the State party and the investor evident 
from their consent and agreement may lead to a more predictable approach to the 
definition of “investment”. It has been suggested that, “[a] rigid list of criteria 
that must be met in every case is not likely to facilitate the task of tribunals or to 
make decisions more predictable.”217 This article disagrees with the foundation 
and articulation of the proponents of the objective approach, except to the extent 
of requiring “investment” to contribute to the economic development of the host 
State. The Salini criteria do not give serious considerations to the consent and 
agreement of the State party and foreign investor to determine what constitute an 
“investment”. Party autonomy should and ought to be the fundamental basis and 
the cornerstone of the process of arbitration. 
Furthermore, the Salini criteria have been criticized by subsequent arbitral 
Tribunals as a formalization of the definition of “investment” that could conflict 
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with the agreement of the State party and foreign investor on the meaning of 
‘investment’.218 In the case of Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) (BGT) Ltd v. Tanzania,219 
the investment dispute arose out of a contract between Biwater and Dar es 
Salaam Water and Sewage Authority, an agency of the government of Tanzania, 
for the expansion of a Water and Sewage project in Tanzania.220 Biwater initiated 
proceedings against the government of Tanzania for alleged acts of expropriation 
by the Tanzanian government.221 On the definition of “investment”, BGT relied 
on the objective approach founded on the Salini criteria; the government of 
Tanzania contended that BGT’s ownership of 51% of City Water, a Tanzanian 
company does not constitute an “investment” within the meaning of the ICSID 
Convention.222 On the definition of ‘investment’, the Tribunal held inter alia that 
it could not find any basis for the wholesale application of the Salini criteria and 
that to do so would be applying the criteria as a matter of law that is unsupported 
by the ICSID Convention.223 It noted however, that the travaux preparatoires of 
the Convention indicates that attempts to define the term were unsuccessful.224 
Nevertheless, this Tribunal expressed the doubt whether or not arbitral Tribunals 
should impose a definition of “investment” in the absence of a precise definition 
in the ICSID Convention.225 The arbitral Tribunal noted further, that over the 
years more arbitral Tribunals have determined the meaning of “investment” by 
reference to the intention of the State party and foreign investor.226 
It may be argued that in the BGT case, the Tribunal’s reference to “the 
parties” in paragraph 317 of the Award decision connotes the ‘Contracting 
Parties’ under the applicable BIT when paragraph 317 is read in the light of 
paragraph 312.227 This argument may be supported by the Report of the Executive 
Directors of the World Bank which stated that: 
No attempt was made to define the term “investment” given the essential 
requirement of consent by the parties, and the mechanism through which 
Contracting States can make known in advance, if they so desire, the 
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classes of disputes which they would or would not consider submitting to 
the Centre.228 
It should be noted that the basis for this argument stems from the nature of 
international investment agreements and the ICSID Convention upon which the 
Tribunal made the analysis under reference. However, it is contended that in 
paragraph 317, the Tribunal was referring to the host State and the foreign 
investor as parties to the ICSID arbitration; otherwise it would have specifically 
referred to the “Contracting Parties.” Based on the nature of ICSID arbitration, 
the foreign investor adopts the agreement of his home country in a BIT once 
investment is made in the territory of the host State party to the BIT. The BGT 
arbitral Tribunal was, among other issues, called upon to determine whether the 
subject matter of the arbitration was an “investment”.229 To answer this question, 
the arbitral Tribunal like many others before it, examined the legislative history 
of the ICSID Convention, hence the tacit reference to Article 24(4) in paragraph 
312.230 Paragraph 312 can only be read in the light of paragraph 317, to the extent 
that it grants opportunity to the parties to the dispute to define “investment” in 
view of the omission to define the term in the ICSID Convention. Pursuant to the 
ICSID Convention and the applicable BIT, the host State and the foreign investor 
can be parties to a dispute in ICSID arbitration, likewise the State parties to the 
BIT.231 Either way, recourse could be made to the applicable BIT or the ICSID 
Convention to analyze the effect of the omission to define “investment.” 
In the BGT case, the Tribunal also considered the individual contract 
between the host State and the investor.232 The Salini case that generated a lot of 
analysis by subsequent arbitral Tribunals also considered a concession contract in 
addition to the applicable BIT.233 Therefore, it is doubtful that anytime an arbitral 
Tribunal references the legislative history of the ICSID Convention or a BIT 
concluded by State parties, the foreign investor is automatically excluded or 
substituted as a party to the dispute with the result that any reference to “the 
parties” in the analysis of the claims exclusively refers to State parties to BIT or 
the ICSID Convention. In the alternative, it may be argued that based on the 
individual contract and the BIT that was examined by the BGT Tribunal; it is 
unclear which “parties” the Tribunal was referring to in paragraph 317. 
Alternatively, the proposition in the draft under review may be applicable mutatis 
mutandis to the host State and the foreign investor. 
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In contrast, the subjective approach to the definition of “investment” posits 
that, the lack of a concrete meaning of the term under Article 25 (1) of the ICSID 
Convention arises from a fundamental need for parties to determine the meaning 
of the term themselves.234 Reacting to the criticism of the Salini criteria, Schreuer 
appears to note in agreement when he stated that: “[t]hese features should not 
necessarily be understood as jurisdictional requirements but merely as typical 
characteristics of investments under the Convention.”235 
Arbitral Tribunals have demonstrated a lack of consensus on the application 
of the Salini criteria.236 The subjective approach, which is founded on contractual 
freedom of the parties, has not been successful either, in establishing a generally 
acceptable definition of “investment” under the ICSID Convention.237 Applying 
the Salini criteria could lead to challenging the jurisdictional requirements of the 
ISCID Convention as a matter of law.238 
In Mr. Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”),239 the 
office of Mitchell & Associates, an American law firm operating in the 
Democratic Republic, was sealed up on the order of the Military Court on March 
5, 1999. Valuables and documents were seized from the law firm.240 Patrick 
Mitchell submitted a request for arbitration pursuant to the 1984 USA- DRC) 
BIT.241 Mr. Mitchell’s claim alleged that he is a victim of expropriation by the 
DRC in violation of Article III (1) of the BIT entitled to damages.242 DRC had 
argued that the law firm is not an “investment” because the nature of a law firm 
does not contribute to the economic development of the host State.243 On the issue 
whether or not the law firm established in the DRC by Mr. Mitchell constituted 
an “investment” within the framework of the applicable BIT; the award Tribunal 
agreed with the Claimant that the operation of the law firm was an “investment” 
as the term is understood in the context of the ICSID Convention.244 Dissatisfied 
with the reasoning of the Award Tribunal, the DRC commenced the annulment 
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proceeding.245 The DRC essentially called upon the ad-hoc Committee to re-
examine the definition of “investment” in line with the requirement under Article 
25 (1) of the ICSID Convention. The ad-hoc Committee may have followed the 
precedent of the Salini criteria when it identified four main characteristics of 
“investment” including the requirement that investments contributes in some 
fashion, to the economic development of the host State. The ad-hoc Committee 
held that the award is nebulous on the definition of “investment” in the absence 
of any consideration of the relationship between the law and DRC.246 The ad-hoc 
Committee distanced itself from the thesis of the “jurisdictional requirements 
approach” on the definition of “investment”, when it noted further that the 
features of the Salini criteria “are not a formal requirement for the finding that a 
particular activity or transaction constitutes and investment.”247 In conclusion, the 
ad-hoc Committee annulled the original award on the “grounds of manifest 
excess of powers and the failure to state reasons” pursuant to Article 52(1) (b) 
and (e) of the ICSID Convention.248 
In the Patrick Mitchell case, the ad-hoc Committee rejected the award 
Tribunal’s methodology of the application of the Salini criteria in assuming 
jurisdiction with reference to the definition of “investment”. According to the ad-
hoc Committee, instead of making a determination based on the US-DRC BIT, 
the award Tribunal investigated the existence of an “investment” on a voyage of 
its own and failed to state the reasons for its decision on the definition of 
“investment.”249 The ad-hoc Committee suggested that an arbitral Tribunal should 
apply a restrictive approach in the analysis of the definition of “investment”. The 
ad-hoc Committee noted that there must be a restriction on the party’s ability to 
expand the jurisdiction of the ICSID to include investment that might “arbitrarily 
qualify” as foreign investment through investment treaties.250 The ad-hoc 
Committee pointed out that: 
As a legal consulting firm is somewhat uncommon operation from the 
standpoint of the concept of investment, in the opinion of the ad hoc 
Committee it is necessary for the contribution to the economic 
development or at least the interest of the State, in this case the DRC, to 
be somewhat present in the operation. If this were the case, qualifying 
the Claimant as an investor and the services as an investment would be 
possible; furthermore, it would be necessary for the Award to indicate 
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for example by providing it with legal services in a regular manner or by 
specifically bringing investors.251 
The ad-hoc Committee was also vexed by what it considered to be the 
obscurity of the award Tribunal’s notion of “investment”. 252 It went further to 
note that in the definition of “investment”, the award Tribunal referred “to 
various fragments of the operation without finally indicating the reasons” but 
omitted to provide “the slightest explanation as to the relationship between the 
law firm and DRC.”253 Thus, the Patrick Mitchell and Biwater arbitral Tribunals 
questioned and rejected this approach particularly because; it had no legal 
foundation within the framework of the ICSID Convention.254 One opponent of 
the Salini criteria suggested that a “persistent objector” to the Salami test is 
possible.255 According to this commentator, a “persistent objector” is a party who 
reserves the right to question the Salini criteria as a matter of law because its 
jurisdictional value is not supported by the ICSID Convention.256 This 
commentator suggested that the findings of the Fedax/Salini Tribunals were 
apposite, regardless of the inherent notion of contractual freedom that may be 
gleaned from both findings. 257 The same commentator noted that the Fedax 
Tribunal merely presented a list of features that might make “investment” 
recognizable pursuant to the ICSID Convention, while the Salini Tribunal 
“established a list of formal requirements conditioning a finding of jurisdiction” 
to satisfy the requirements of Article 25 (1) with reference to the definition of 
“investment.”258 Thus, the commentator rejected the nuances of the Fedax/Salini 
criteria and argued instead that the contractual freedom to define “investment” 
“as a ‘strong presumption’ under the ICSID Convention seems more convincing 
and suggests that a, ‘a persistent objector to the Salini criteria could be found.’”259 
In view of the preceding analysis, valid arguments could be made one way or 
the other against the jurisprudence of ICSID arbitral practice on the definition of 
“investment” and what is arguably a nebulous approach under Nigeria’s 
international investment regime. However, the current elements of Nigeria’s 
international investment regime are likely to warrant a broader approach to the 
meaning of “investment” in ICSID arbitral practice. Thus, foreign investments in 
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Nigeria’s OGI are likely to be determined as covered and protected investments 
in the context of international investment law. 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE LCA 
Since the coming into force of the LCA in Nigeria, it has been reported that 
because of the preferential treatment given to Nigerian indigenous companies 
particularly in the OGI, the LCA has been fairly successful in achieving its 
objectives. Amanze-Nwachukwu, reporting on the implementation of the LCA, 
observed that since the LCA was signed into law, there has been an increase in 
the participation of indigenous companies in the OGI of Nigeria with the result 
that indigenous contractors are now able to compete with their foreign 
counterparts.260 Amanze-Nwachukwu went on to report that since the LCA 
received presidential assent three years ago, “[t] he Petroleum Technology 
Association of Nigeria (“PETAN”), the umbrella body of indigenous contractors 
announced recently that its membership has doubled owing to the conscientious 
implementation of the local content law.”261. On his part, Atsegbua enthused that 
because of the enactment of the LCA, “an antidote has been found for local 
participation in the vibrant oil and gas sector.”262 Atsegbua concluded: “similar to 
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Kuwait, the local content law will go a long way in 
empowering indigenous oil and gas companies and assist Nigeria in developing 
the technical capacity for the industry.”263 
The enthusiasm expressed in the commentary about the outcome and effect 
of the LCA is understandable when viewed from the perspective of the 
successive Nigerian governments’ efforts at improving local capacity building in 
the OGI. This is because this is a sector of the Nigerian economy that accounts 
for more than 50 percent of Nigeria’s GDP. 264The success of the LCA may be 
described as an achievement of the Nigerian government’s objective for the 
promotion of economic development through the utility of an approach that 
supports local competences. It is arguable, that in international investment 
paradigms, the enactment of the LCA may be characterized as an exercise of a 
legitimate policy objective of the Nigerian government. However, the pertinent 
question to ask is whether the LCA treats foreign investors and local investors 
equally with reference to foreign investment in Nigeria’s OGI. If not, will the 
LCA pass the test of reasonable justification when analyzed against pertinent 
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provisions and features of Nigeria’s BITs in the context of the substantive and 
procedural rights of foreign investors in Nigeria’s OGI. 
The definition of a Nigerian company under the LCA offers the best 
departure point to address some of the likely criticisms that could be made 
against the LCA in the context of international investment law. Pursuant to the 
LCA, a Nigerian company “means a company formed and registered in Nigeria 
in accordance with the provision of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(“CAMA”) with not less than 51% equity shares by Nigerians”(emphasis 
added).265 The LCA is silent on the definition of “exclusive consideration”, but 
when Section 109 is read in the light of Section 26 of the LCA two propositions 
are discernible in the context of foreign investors owning majority shares in 
companies incorporated in Nigeria.266 Firstly, companies incorporated in Nigeria 
pursuant to CAMA267 with shares of more than 50% held by foreign investors are 
not considered Nigerian companies under the LCA contrary to the provisions of 
Sections 18 and 650 of CAMA that allows foreign investors to own majority 
shares in companies incorporated under CAMA.268 In other words, the notion of 
“an indigenous Nigerian company” is alien to CAMA. Thus, the provision of the 
LCA on the definition of a company ignores the established meaning of a 
company under CAMA prior to the enactment of the Act. Secondly, companies 
incorporated under CAMA with majority shares owned by foreign investors may 
be considered as foreign investors under Nigeria’s existing BITs. For example, 
under Article 1(d) of the Nigeria-UK BIT, a company for the purpose of the BIT 
“means with regard to either Contracting Party, corporations, firms, associations 
and other legal persons incorporated or constituted under the law in force in any 
part of each Contracting Party or in any territory to which this Agreement is 
extended . . .”269 
On the one hand, it may be argued that the LCA has an inherent 
discriminatory policy against the interest of existing foreign investments in 
Nigeria’s OGI. In the context of investment treaty arbitration, a case of 
discrimination that offends the elements of the foreign investment treatment 
standards examined above could be made by foreign investors against the 
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government of Nigeria. This might be possible based on the provisions of Section 
3 of the LCA. The Section states: 
(1) Nigerian independent operators shall be given first consideration in 
the award of oil blocks, oil field licenses, oil lifting licenses and in all 
projects for which contracts for which contracts is to be awarded in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry to the fulfillment of such conditions as may 
be specified by the Minister. 
(2) There shall be exclusive consideration to Nigerian indigenous service 
companies which demonstrate ownership of equipment, Nigerian 
personnel and capacity to execute such work to bid on land and swamp 
operating areas of the Nigerian oil and gas industry for contracts and 
services contained in the Schedule to this Act. 
(3) Compliance with the provisions of this Act and promotion of 
Nigerian content development shall be a major criterion for award of 
licenses, permits and any other interest in bidding for oil exploration, 
production, transportation and development or any other operations in 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. 270 
On the other hand, apart from the “exclusive and first consideration” 
principles espoused by the above provisions in favor of “indigenous Nigerian 
companies” in the LCA, Section 15 of the LCA also mandates operators in the 
OGI to give “full and fair opportunity” to Nigerian indigenous contractors in the 
bidding process for acquiring goods and services in the OGI. 271 The LCA did not 
define “full and fair opportunity”. However, according to Adefulu, in practice, 
the meaning of the phrase “would require that Nigerian companies are given 
adequate notice of tenders and have access to the necessary information required 
to bid as their foreign counterpart would.”272 Adefulu went on to argue that the 
“full and fair opportunity” phrase in Section 15 of the LCA “does not appear to 
be a discriminatory measure and only seeks to ensure that Nigerian companies 
are treated in an equitable manner.”273 It is contended that, if read in light of 
Section 3 of the LCA, Section 15 ought to be interpreted to give preferential 
treatment to Nigerian indigenous contractors in the bidding process for goods and 
services in the OGI. It is submitted that, preferential treatment against the 
potential interest of foreign investments in the territory of the host State could be 
interpreted as a discriminatory measure in the context of the NT, MFN or FET 
standard obligations of the host State under international investment law. Thus, 
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Adefulu’s submission on the interpretation of “full and fair opportunity” in 
Section 15 of the LCA is less convincing. 
Furthermore, it may be argued that Section 1 of the LCA cures the conflict 
between it and the provisions of CAMA particularly on the meaning of company 
under Nigerian Law.274 At the same time, the section cannot be interpreted to 
make the provisions of the LCA supersede the provisions of Nigeria’s BITs in 
the context of investment treaty arbitration. To the contrary, Sections 3 and 15 of 
the LCA in particular, are likely to be interpreted by an arbitral Tribunal as a 
violation of the foreign investment treatment standards in Nigeria’s existing 
BITs. Some investment arbitration cases reinforce this possibility. For example in 
Tecnicas Medioambientales Techmed SA v. United Mexican States275 the ICSID 
arbitration was based on the Mexico-Spain BIT that entered into force for both 
countries on December 18, 1996.276 The Claimant in this case is a foreign investor 
organized under the laws of Mexico.277 The Claimant commenced arbitration 
proceedings against the host State contending inter alia that, the refusal of an 
agency of the Respondent to renew its license to operate a landfill it had acquired 
with substantial investment is attributable to the Respondent under the applicable 
BIT.278 The Claimant alleged that the “refusal to extend its authorization to 
operate the landfill is an arbitrary act” which violates the Mexico-Spain BIT, 
international law and Mexican law.279 While the alleged acts of violations against 
the Respondent were not caused by the passing of a legislation stricto sensu, the 
investment dispute in this case arose through a series of actions by the agencies 
of the Respondent that introduced regulations and resolutions that effectively 
forced the Claimant to close its investment in the host State.280 It was also claimed 
that the actions of the agencies of the Respondent violated the conditions upon 
which the foreign investor made its investment.281 
For the purpose of analyzing the likely effect of the pertinent sections of the 
LCA under review, it is instructive to note that, in this arbitration, the Claimant 
specifically alleged that the actions of the agencies of the Respondent was a 
violation of Articles 3(1), 3(2), 4(1), 4(5), 5(1), 5(2) and 5(3) of the Mexico-
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2003). 
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Spain BIT.282 In this regard, the Claimant alleged loss of profit and business 
opportunities in the host State.283 The Articles allegedly violated under the 
Mexico-Spain BIT provided guarantees for the general principles of foreign 
investment treatment standards of similar to the provisions under Nigeria’s 
existing BITs.284 It its memorial to the ICSID arbitration, the Respondent 
specifically denied that the conduct of any of its agencies constituted a violation 
of the Mexico-Spain BIT.285 The Respondent denied that the Claimant suffered 
any form of discrimination or was denied NT in violation of the guarantees 
contained in the Mexico-Spain BIT.286 Analyzing the parameters of Article 4(1) 
of the Spain-Mexico BIT that specifically provides for a “fair and equitable 
treatment standard” of foreign investment in the territory of the host State, this 
arbitral Tribunal found that the FET, as a bona fide principle recognized under 
international law, does not require evidence of bad faith against the host State for 
its violation.287 Consequently, the Tribunal was unequivocal in its analysis of the 
FET treatment standard when it stated that: 
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in 
light of the good faith principle established by international law, requires 
the Contracting States to provide to international investments treatment 
that does not affect basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the 
host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relationship with the foreign investor, so that it may 
know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its 
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and the 
administrative practices and directives, to be able to plan its investment 
and comply with such regulations. The foreign investor also expects the 
host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any 
preexisting decisions or permits issued by the State that were relied upon 
by the investor to assume its commitments as well as plan and launch its 
commercial and business activities. The investor also expects the State to 
use the legal instruments that govern the action of the investor or the 
investment in conformity with the function usually assigned to such 
instruments, and not to deprive the investor of its investment without 
required compensation. In fact, failure by the host State to comply with 
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such pattern of conduct with respect to the foreign investor or its 
investments affects the investor’s ability to measure the treatment and 
protection awarded by the host State and to determine whether the 
actions of the host State conform to the fair and equitable treatment 
principle. Therefore, compliance by the host State with such pattern of 
conduct is closely related to the above-mentioned principle, to the actual 
chances of enforcing such principle, and to excluding the possibility that 
state action be characterized as arbitrary; i.e. as presenting insufficiencies 
that would be recognized . . . 288 
A valid argument can be made that exceptions may exist under NT and MFN 
treatment standards in some of Nigeria’s existing BITs that may justify the 
enactment of the LCA.289 Still, there is authority for the proposition that the host 
State should still be found liable in breach, if local competitors of the foreign 
investor in the host State have received more favorable treatment. This 
proposition’s premise arises from the question whether the host State has 
discriminated against the interest of the foreign investor through policy or 
legislation that might make the foreign investor less competitive in the host 
State.290 Based on the underlying principles of the NT or MFN treatment 
standards, arbitral Tribunals are called upon to make a comparison of the host 
State’s treatment of local investors with the treatment of foreign investors in “like 
circumstances” to determine a breach of the NT or MFN treatment standards of 
foreign investments.291 
In Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of 
Ecuador,292 the investment arbitration was based on the U.S-Ecuador BIT.293 The 
investment dispute arose from a service, exploration, and exploitation of  a 
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hydrocarbon agreement executed between the Claimant and the Respondent’s 
State-owned corporation.294 Under the investment agreement, the Claimant made 
investments pursuant to its obligation and the right to carry out exploration and 
exploitation activities in the area assigned to it.295 Based on the agreement in 
issue, the Claimant was entitled to a percentage of the oil production expressed in 
the form of a participation formula described in the agreements as Factor X.296 
The State-owned corporation had a mandate under the laws of Ecuador to plan, 
organize, and operate hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in Ecuador.297 
The Claimant commenced arbitration against the Respondent alleging that the 
right to the refund of taxes pursuant to the agreements and which was secured 
under Formula X ought to be recognized and effected under Ecuadorian Tax 
Law.298 The Claimant further contended that resolutions denying Value Added 
Tax refunds to it breached Ecuador’s obligations of FET; treatment not less 
favorable than that accorded to an Ecuadorian exporter; not to impair by arbitrary 
or discriminatory measures the management, use and enjoyment of the 
Claimant’s investment and not to expropriate directly or indirectly all or part of 
that investment in the circumstances of the case under the US-Ecuador BIT.299 
The Respondent denies the allegation of the Claimant.300 Of particular relevance 
to the thesis of this article was the contention of the Claimant that the Respondent 
had breached the national and MFN treatment standard of the US-Ecuador BIT.301 
The Claimant hinged its argument on the fact that a number of Ecuadorian 
companies involved in the export of other goods were entitled to receive VAT, 
asserting that the meaning of “in like situations” refers to companies that are 
engaged in exports of goods even if operating in different sectors of the 
economy.302 The Claimant referenced Ecuador’s BIT with Spain and Argentina 
and argued that the standard of NT was not qualified by the reference to “in like 
situations”, therefore the Claimant should be entitled to a less restrictive 
interpretation of the MFN clause under the US-Ecuador BIT.303 The arbitral 
Tribunal agreed with the submission of the Claimant with reference to the 
allegation of the breach of the national and MFN clause of the US-Spain BIT.304 
According to  this arbitral Tribunal, “in like situations cannot be interpreted in 
the narrow sense advanced by Ecuador as the purpose of NT is to protect 
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investors as compared to local producers, and this cannot be done by addressing 
exclusively the sector in which the particular activity is done.”305 
The approach by the Occidental and Techmed arbitral Tribunals appears to 
be consistent with the need for the protection of the legitimate expectations of the 
foreign investor before and after starting the foreign investment journey in the 
host State.306 The failure to fulfill the legitimate expectation of the foreign 
investor at the time of making the investment may be held to be a breach of the 
obligation of the fair and equitable principle standard and by extension the 
national and most favored nation treatment standards.307 The legitimate 
expectation of the foreign investor includes the consideration that the law of the 
host State will remain unchanged in a manner that will not be discriminatory 
against the legitimate interests of the foreign investor.308 Gallus notes that “[t]he 
protection of legitimate expectations [of the foreign investor] is also often 
described as an element of the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment 
standard.”309 
Thus, it is contended that, Nigeria’s LCA is a breach of the international 
treatment standards obligations of Nigeria under its BITs regime in the context of 
investment arbitration. However, the point is not lost, that the LCA speaks to 
considerations for economic development as Nigeria’s legitimate expectation in 
the latter’s international investment law regime.310 Nevertheless, a balanced 
approach that incorporates Nigeria’s BIT obligations or makes an effective 
economic development exception is proposed. According to the Tribunal in 
Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine311 “ . . . it is relevant to consider the 
vicissitudes of the economy of the State that is host to the investment in 
determining the investor’s legitimate expectations, the protection of which is a 
major concern of the minimum standards of treatment contained in bilateral 
investment treaties . . . “312 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Nigeria-Germany BIT presents an example of a valid development 
exception that may accommodate the LCA if renegotiated into Nigeria’s other 
BITs and the NIPC Act. However, it may still be difficult to establish whether or 
not measures under the current law do not significantly affect the interests of 
foreign investors in Nigeria as required under the Nigeria-Germany BIT. This 
consideration is more relevant in a scenario where the alleged act, measure or 
legislation may be characterized as discriminatory. This difficulty underscores 
the interpretative uncertainty over the host State’s economic development 
expectations and the encompassing FET treatment standard obligation.313 The 
need to employ a balanced approach in Nigeria’s international investment regime 
is further reinforced by its commitment to constantly observe obligations it has 
assumed in connection with specific foreign investments in its territory that 
includes the OGI. This commitment is required by an “umbrella clause,” a 
provision found in most of Nigeria’s BITs.314 There is no doubt that regardless of 
the inconsistency in the commentary and ICSID arbitral practice on the meaning 
of “investment,” foreign investments in the OGI are protected investments 
because of a real possibility to define the term broadly in view of the current state 
of Nigeria’s international investment regime. A review that would accommodate 
the LCA as a “development policy” exception under international investment law 
is urgent, necessary, and warranted. There is convincing commentary that the 
utility of the OGI in developing countries ought to and should contribute to 
meaningful and effective economic development.315 However, there could be far- 
reaching and negative economic implications on the local economy, where the 
objective of economic development through the promotion of local content in the 
OGI is achieved with a mechanism that is conflicted with the substantive and 
procedural rights of foreign investors in the context of international investment 
law and investment treaty arbitration. 
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